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Whose Crime is it Anyway?: Liability for 
the Lethal Acts of Nonparticipants in 
the Felony 
Picture an old James Cagney movie, where three swaggering rob- 
bers enter a bank, point a gun at the young cashier, and demand her 
money or her life. A getaway car waits outside with the motor run- 
ning. The cashier hands over a bag of money and begins to scream. 
The robbers grab the bag and run outside, where all bedlam breaks 
loose. The police arrive on the scene, a gun battle ensues, and by- 
standers run for cover. When the dust settles, an innocent bystander 
lies dead, killed by a bullet from a policeman's gun during the 
shootout. 
Now, picture a drug deal that goes sour in an unlit stairway in a 
rundown apartment building.' The intended victim, an undercover 
police officer, seizes the weapon and a struggle  develop^.^ The in- 
jured officer draws his revolver and begins shooting, a bullet hits his 
leg.3 The backup team arrives and a fusillade of gunfire  ensue^.^ The 
grim result is realized in the aftermath of the shooting-one of the 
police officers is dead from a single shot to the head.5 The bullet is 
not recovered, and it is not known who fired the fatal shot.6 
Both of these scenarios involve a similar issue: Who, if anyone, 
should be liable for the death of these two nonparticipants in the 
* Associate Professor of Law, Pace University. B.A. 1977, The University at Al- 
bany; J.D. 1981, Syracuse University. 
I wish to express my appreciation for the research assistance of Maria R Ashley 
and Susanne Kantor. 
1. People v. Hernandez, 588 N.Y.S.2d 567-68 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992), affd, 624 
N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1993). 
2. Id. 
3. Id. 
4. Id. 
5. Id. 
6. Id. 
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crime? The felony-murder doctrine, which originated in England, 
generally provides that when a death occurs during the perpetration 
of a felony, the defendant is liable for homicide, even if defendant 
lacked the intent to Because of the harsh results imposed by the 
doctrine, it has received a substantial body of criticism, including be- 
ing called a " 'barbaric' concept that . . . erodes the relation between 
criminal liability and moral culpability . . . ."* Despite these criticisms, 
this theory of liability has survived for over 200 years? However, the 
felony-murder doctrine has been subjected to many different modii- 
cations, that vary considerably from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.1° 
The most problematic issue surrounding the felony-murder doc- 
trine is how far to extend the doctrine in imposing murder liability on 
a defendant who did not perform the act of killing when the act re- 
sults in the death of a nonparticipant. Because the felony-murder 
doctrine does not require any intent, legislatures and courts have re- 
lied on the element of causation to either extend or restrict liability in 
that factual situation." This approach has led to inconsistent and 
confusing results, stemming from imprecise draftsmanship, inaccurate 
understanding of the theories of causation, and differing policy 
reasons. 
This Article explores the methodology that courts should employ 
when determining the liability of a defendant under the felony-mur- 
der doctrine, where the perpetration of a felony results in the death of 
- a nonparticipant in the crime by another nonparticipant. Part I of the 
Article addresses the history of the doctrine, the policies that have 
sustained it throughout history, and the modern statutory promulga- 
tions of the rule. Part I1 explores not only how courts have handled 
the doctrine's causation requirement, but also how legislatures have 
responded to this requirement. Further, Part I1 discusses the court- 
created theories of agency and proximate cause. 
Part I11 addresses the need for a consistent analytical framework 
and demonstrates the current confusion that has resulted fiom courts 
construing a statute to require different causation approaches. Part 
I11 submits that the courts' reliance on the agency theory, which re- 
quires an initial determination that a felon shot the fatal bullet, is in- 
consistent with both society's view towards crime and principles of 
statutory analysis. By applying the agency theory, the courts are using 
7. RONALD A. ANDERSON, 1 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE 539 
(1957). 
8. People v. Dillon, 668 P.2d 697, 709 (Cal. 1983) (citations omitted). 
9. For a discussion of the felony-murder doctrine's historical development and 
ultimate survival, see sources cited inpa notes 1434 and accompanying text 
10. For a discussion of the numerous statutory modifications to the doctrine, see 
sources cited inpa notes 51-71 and accompanying text. 
11. For a discussion of the causation element of the doctrine, see sources cited 
inpa notes 72-150 and accompanying text. 
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causation to restrict the application of the felony-murder doctrine, a 
responsibility that should be left to the legislature. 
Part IV proposes a methodology that is consistent with both prin- 
ciples of statutory interpretation and society's view toward crime. This 
approach uses the ordinary rules of causation and modifies them to 
apply to felony-murder. As an example, the proposed methodology is 
applied to various factual scenarios where the person who does the 
killing is unknown, or is someone other than the defendant, and the 
victim is a nonparticipant in the felony. Under this analysis, courts 
can not only interpret the causation requirement of the felony-mur- 
der doctrine consistently, but can also ensure the uniform administra- 
tion of justice. 
The felony-murder doctrine, although much maligned, is still a 
frequently used theory of liability. Its continued viability reflects the 
societal judgment that a felony resulting in a death, even if that death 
rvas not intended, should be punished more severely than a felony not 
resulting in a death.'* The felony-murder doctrine should continue 
to exist if the above conclusion accurately represents society's judg- 
ment, and further, if the development of crimes should indeed depict 
societal judgrnent.13 Thus, it is necessary to examine the history and 
policies behind the felony-murder rule, as well as the numerous statu- 
tory promulgations of the rule, to determine whether the doctrine has 
continued viability. 
A. The Histmy of the Doctrine 
All homicides were considered to be criminal at early common 
law.'* The mental state of the actor was deemed irrelevant.15 All 
12. David Crump & Susan Waite Crump, In D 4 m e  ofthe Felony M u r h  Doctrine, 8 
k v .  J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 359, 363 (1985). 
13. Id. The aim of criminal law is to prevent harm to society. It accomplishes 
that aim by punishing those who have done harm. Thus, it follows that criminal law 
must reflect those areas that society feels are deserving of punishment. See gaeraUy 
Joseph R Gusfield, On Legislating Morals: The Symbolic Process ofDesignatingDeviance, 56 
CAL. L. REV. 54, 5&59 (1968). 
14. People v. Burroughs, 678 P.2d 894, 903-04 (Cal. 1984) (Bird, C.J., concur- 
ring) (citing ROY MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 1-4 (1952); Paul H. Robinson, A 
Brief Histoy of Distinctions in Criminal Culpability, 31 HAsl l~~s L.J. 815, 823 (1980); 
Francis Bowes Sayre, Mem Rea, 45 HARV. L. REV. 974, 977-81 (1932)). 
15. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing ROY MORELAND, THE LAW OF HOMICIDE 1-4 
(1952); Paul H. Robinson, A Brief Histoy of Distindionr in Criminal Culpability, 31 ]HAS 
n N G s  L.J. 815,823 (1980); Francis Bowes Sayre, Mem Rea, 45 W v .  L. REV. 974,977- 
81 (1932)). 
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homicides were punishable by death.16 By the thirteenth century, 
"the law . . . recognized the need to distinguish between intentional 
and . . . [unintentional] killings."" Although an accidental killing 
would not entitle a defendant to an acquittal, he could be granted a 
royal pardon.'' 
The Church had a strong influence on the development of the 
law of homicide. Because the Church refused to impose capital pun- 
ishment, submitting a case to the jurisdiction of the Church meant 
that instead of death the defendant was only subjected to the brand- 
ing of his thumb and imprisonment.lg Known as the "benefit of 
clergy," this practice was expanded to cover all persons who were liter- 
ate, under the premise that those persons were clerics and thus ineli- 
gible for the death Thus, the law began to impose degrees 
of punishment based on the accused's character rather than the na- 
ture of the offense. 
As the injustice of this system became increasingly obvious, a se- 
ries of statutes were promulgated in the fifteenth and sixteenth centu- 
ries that abolished the "benefit of clergy" for homicides that were 
committed with "malice aforethought" or "malice ~repensed."~' 
These more culpable homicides were called "murders," while the less 
culpable homicides for which "benefit of clergy" was still available be- 
came "mansla~ghter."~~ 
It was at about this time that the felony-murder doctrine came 
into existence. Although the most frequently cited statement of the 
rule appears in Lord Coke's Third Institute, commentators have con- 
cluded that Coke's creation of the rule is without any legal founda- 
t i ~ n . ~ ~  Coke's description of the rule was subsequently refined and 
16. Id. at 904 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing ROLLIN M. PERKINS & RONALD N. 
BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 14 (3d ed. 1982); Jeanne Hall Seibold, Note, The Felony M u r k  
Rule: In Search o f a  Viable Doctrine, 23 CATH. LAW 133 n.1 (1978)). 
17. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring). 
18. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing McGautha v. California, 402 U.S. 183, 197 
(1971); Rollin M. Perkins, A Re-examination of Malice Afmhought, 43 YALE L.J. 537,539- 
40 (1934); Sayre, supra note 14, at 980). 
19. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing Sayre, supra note 14, at 99&97). 
20. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing Note, Felony M u r k  as a First Degree Offme: 
An Anachronism Retained, 66 YALE L.J. 427, 429 (1957)). 
21. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring). 
22. Id. at 904-05 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing Perkins, szcpra note 18, at 543- 
44). 
23. Id. at 905 (Bird, C.J., concurring). In his treatise, Lord Coke illustrates the 
rule but does not give any rationale for i t  He states: 
"If the act be unlawful it is murder. As if A. meaning to steal a deer in 
the park of B., shooteth at the deer, and by the glance of the arrow killeth a 
boy that is hidden in a bush: this is murder, for that the act was un lah l ,  
although A. had no intent to hurt the boy, nor knew not of him. But if B. 
the owner of the park had shot at his own deer, and without any ill intent 
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limited to find murder when a killing is committed in the course of a 
felony, regardless of the defendant's intent.24 
The felony-murder rule was abolished by the English Parliament 
in the Homicide Act of 1957.25 The English statute now provides that 
"a killing in the course of a felony is not murder unless the essential 
element of malice is independently proved."26 However, because the 
condition of English common law in 1776 served as the basis for the 
development of American common law, Blackstone's version of the 
felony-murder rule became an integral part of American jurispru- 
den~e .~ '  Yet, for over two hundred years American courts and legisla- 
tures have dealt with the doctrine in myriad ways. 
As early as 1794, the Pennsylvania Legislature broke away from 
the English tradition by dividing murder into two degrees, with only 
first degree murder punishable by death.28 The Ohio Legislature 
had killed the boy by the glance of his arrow, this had been homicide by 
misadventure, and no felony." 
Id. (Bird, C.J., concumng) (quoting Lorn COKE, THIRD  IN^ 56 (6th ed. 1680)); 
see also People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304, 309 & n.22 (Mich. 1980) (quoting Lorn 
COKE, THIRD INSI~TUTES 56 (1797)). Although this statement went unquestioned for 
over two hundred years, no one seems to know the basis for the statement. See Bur- 
roughs, 678 P.2d at 90506. While two sixteenth century cases have been suggested as 
support, courts and critics have since concluded that these cases stood for a diierent 
proposition. Id at 905. For a discussion of those cases, see i d  at 906 n.9 (Bird, C.J., 
concumng) (quoting Aaron, 299 N.W.2d at 307-08). 
24. Burroughs, 678 P.2d at 905 (Bird, C.J., concurring) (stating that "the rule was 
redefined by Hale and Foster, who limited the murder designation to any killing in 
the course of a felony.") (citing 1 SIR M.4-v EIALE, PLEAS OF THE CROWN 465,475 
(1847); SIR MICHAEL FOSTER, CROWN CASES 25&59 (2d ed. 1791)). 
25. Id. at 907 (Bird, C.J., concurring). 
26. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring). Chief Justice Bird notes the following with re- 
gard to the English Homicide Act of 1957: 
Section 1 of the act provided in relevant part: 
"Where a person kills another in the course or furtherance of some 
other offence, the killing shall not amount to murder unless done with the 
same malice aforethought (express or implied) as is required for a killing to 
amount to murder when not done in the course or furtherance of another 
offence." 
Id. (Chief Justice Bird quoting Sidney Prevezer, One English Homicide Act: A New At- 
tempt to Revise the Law of Murder, 57 COLUM. L. REV. 633-36 (1957)). 
27. Id. at 908 (Bird, C.J., concurring). The rule is stated in Blackstone's as 
follows: 
w h e n  an involuntary killing happens in consequence of an unlawful act, it 
will be either murder or manslaughter according to the nature of the act 
which occasioned it. If it be in prosecution of a felonious intent, or in it's 
[sic] consequences naturally tended to bloodshed, it will be murder; but if no 
more was intended than a mere civil trespass, it will only amount to 
manslaughter. 
Id. n.17 (Bird, C.J., concumng) (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 192-93 
(Tucker ed., 1803) (footnote omitted)). 
28. Edwin R Keedy, Histmy of the Pennsylvania Statute CreatingDegrees of Murder, 97 
U. PA. L. REV. 759,772-73 & n.99 (1949) (citing 4 J. OF SENATE 242 (Pa. 1794)). 
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promulgated the statutory abolition of felony-murder in 1854.29 Fur- 
ther, Oliver Wendell Holmes questioned the Ohio rule's validity in 
1881.30 
Catapulted by the Model Penal Code, and Illinois and New York 
Penal Law revisions, a huge upsurge of reform took place in the 1960s 
and 1970s." In total, more than half of the states' penal codes were 
revised during this period.32 ConsequentIy, the felony-murder rule 
went through numerous legislative modifications. These legislative 
modifications, coupled with court created interpretations, have led to 
many d ierent  versions of the rule. Despite all of the criticisms of the 
it currently remains in force in all but three  jurisdiction^.^^ 
B. Policies Underlying the Doctrine 
There have been various justifications for the felony murder doc- 
trine over the years.s5 Under the theory of deterrence, proponents 
argue that co-felons will not resort to violence while committing a fel- 
29. Burroughs, 678 P.2d at 908 (Bird, C.J., concumng) (citing Robbins v. State, 8 
Ohio St. 131, 188-90 (1857) (holding that intent is an essential ingredient of 
murder)). 
30. Id. (Bird, C.J., concurring) (citing OLWER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON 
LAW 57-58 (1881)). 
31. RICHARD G. SINGER & MARTIN R GARDNER, CRIMES AND PUNISH~IENT: CASES, 
~ ~ T E R I A L S ,  AND READINGS IN CRIMINAL LAW 388-91 (1989) (citing Model Penal Code 
5 210.2); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 9, para. 9-1 (Supp. 1993); N.Y. PENAL AW § 125.25 (Mc- 
Kinney 1987). See generally Jo Anne C. Alderstein, Felony M u r k  in the New Criminal 
Codes, 4 AM J. CRIM. L. 249 (1975-1976). 
32. See, e.6, ARK. CODE ANN. $5 41-1501 to 1505 (Michie Supp. 1993) (revision in 
effect 1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3102 (West 1993) (revision in effect 1972); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 53a-54c (West 1993) (revision in effect 1971); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
5 635-035 (1993) (revision in effect 1973); FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 782.04 (West 1993) 
(revision in effect 1975); GA. CODE ANN. 5 26-1101 (Michie 1993) (revision in effect 
1969); HAW. REV. STAT. 5 701-04 (1993) (revision in effect 1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 
38 para. 9-1 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (revision in effect 1962); KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 21-3401 
(1993) (revision in effect 1970); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 507.020 (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 
1993) (revision in effect 1975); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, 5 201-03 (West 1993) 
(revision in effect 1976); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 609.185-195 (West 1993) (revision in 
effect 1963); MONT. CODE ANN. 5 945-102 (1993) (revision in effect 1974). For others 
statutes, see the attached Appendix. 
33. For a discussion of criticisms of the felony-murder doctrine, see People v. 
Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980). 
34. The felony-murder statute was abolished by the legislature in Hawaii and 
Kentucky. HAW. REV. STAT. 5 707-710 (1976); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 507.020 (Michie/ 
Bobbs Memll 1975). It was held to be unconstitutional by the Michigan Supreme 
Court in People v. Aaron, 299 N.W.2d 304 (Mich. 1980). Other states, while not abol- 
ishing the felony-murder doctrine, have required some level of mens rea. See inza 
note 54 and accompanying text. 
35. See generally Nelson E. Roth & Scott E. Sundby, The Felony- Murder Rule: A 
Doctrine at Cmtitutional CmssroadF, 70 CORNELL . REV. 446, 450-60 (1985). 
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ony if they may be held liable for m ~ r d e r . 3 ~  The doctrine has also 
been viewed as a deterrent to dangerous fel~nies.~' The deterrence 
rationale has been criticized widely as illogical and illegitimate. Those 
opposing the rationale argue that an unintended act cannot be de- 
terred.38 Another criticism is that few felons, if any, will know about 
the felony-murder doctrine or believe that a killing will actually re- 
s ~ l t ~ ~  Finally, the critics maintain that there is no evidence that a 
disproportionate number of killings occur during felonies.40 
The problem with such criticism is that it may be overly simplis- 
Although it is likely that most felons cannot cite to the felony- 
murder statute, it is equally probable that the general population is at 
least aware of the basic premise of the felony-murder doctrine. In 
addition, the premise that accidental killings cannot be deterred is 
inconsistent with the expanding amount of strict liability crimes, 
which often rely on a deterrence rationale.42 There is no empirical 
evidence to suggest that a felon would not be deterred from commit- 
ting a violent crime, yet there is evidence to suggest that serious crime' 
36. Id. at 450. The authors conclude that the deterrence rationale consists of two 
strains: defendants are deterred from committing accidental or negligent killings 
during felonies, and defendants are deterred from committing dangerous felonies. 
Id. at 450-51; see also Robert Mauldin Elliot, Comment, The Merger Doctrine as a Limita- 
tion on the Felony Murder R u k  A Balance o f  Criminal Law Principles, 13 WAKE FOREST L. 
REV. 369, 374 (1977) ("[M]ostjurisdictions have characterized the purpose to be . . . 
the deterrence of negligent or accidental killings during the perpetration of a fel- 
ony."). But see Jonathan K. Van Patten, Comment, Merger and the Califmia Felony 
Murder Rule, 20 UCLA L. REV. 250, 258-59 n.41 (1972) (finding it difficult to see how 
an accidental homicide can be deterred). 
37. See People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 139, (Cal. 1965) (Burke, J., dissent- 
ing) (the purpose of the felony-murder rule is to deter felons from undertaking in- 
herently dangerous felonies); State v. Williams, 254 So. 2d 548, 550-51 (Ha. 1971) 
(The felony-murder statute creates "a deterrent effect to the commission of [inher- 
ently dangerous] felonies by substituting the mere intent to commit those felonies for 
the premeditated design to effect death . . . ."). 
38. Van Patten, supra note 36, at 258-59 n.41. 
39. See generally Philip D. Zeliko~v, Comment, The Constitutionality of Imposing the 
Death Penalty for Felony Murder, 15 Hous. L. REV. 356, 376-79 (1978). 
40. Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782,799-800 (1982) (finding, in its summation 
of statistical data, that only one-half of one percent of all robberies result in 
homicide). 
41. See Crump & Crump, supra note 12, at 369-71 (concluding that deterrence is 
a valid rationale). 
42. One argument advanced in justif~cation of strict liability in public welfare 
offenses is that the protection of societal interests requires a high standard of care 
which people will be more likely to maintain if they know that lack of intent will not 
excuse them. See generally Regina v. City of Sault Ste. Mark, 2 S.C.R. 1299 (Can. 1978); 
Kathleen F. Brickey, Criminal Liability of Corporate Oficers for Strict Liability Offmes- 
Another Vim, 35 VAND. L. REV. 1337 (1982); Deve@nmts in the LautCorporate Crime: 
Regulating Corporate Behavior Through Criminal Sanctions, 92 HARV. L. REV. 1227 (1979). 
Heinonline - -  71 U. Det. Mercy 229 1993-1994 
is subject to deterrence if the consequences are communicated to the 
potential defendant?3 
Courts and commentators have also justified the doctrine on the 
basis that the defendant committed a felony which resulted in a kill- 
ing. Because the defendant has committed a heinous act, he deserves 
to be severely punished. This retribution or condemnation theory of 
punishment focuses on punishing the defendant based on the serious- 
ness of the harm, rather than his intent.44 Again, although the justifi- 
cation of retribution has been severely criti~ized:~ it continues to be 
cited by the courts as a rationale for the d~c t r ine?~  
The felony-murder doctrine does communicate that a crime that 
takes a human life is different from one that does not, and is thus 
deserving of a more severe punishment?' Thus, through retribution 
and condemnation, societal norms and values are reinforced; the 
"bad person" is punished, and the conduct of good persons is re- 
warded. As one court stated, one goal of sentencing is "community 
condemnation. . . or [the] reaffirmation of societal norms for the pur- 
pose of maintaining respect for the norms them~elves."~~ Fear of 
crime continues to pervade our society.*' Some researchers have ex- 
plained that this fear of crime is an indication of perceived social dis- 
order.50 This social disorder can be restructured through retribution 
and punishment. 
Although critics have maligned the policies underlying the fel- 
ony-murder doctrine, its continued viability suggests that those poli- 
cies reflect a strong societal interest. A felony that results in a death 
should be punished more severely than a felony that does not, even if 
there was no intent to cause the death. Since the evolution of crimes 
should indeed represent societal judgment, the felony-murder doc- 
trine continues to thrive despite all the criticisms. 
43. See Crump & Crump, supra note 12, at 369-371. 
44. See State v. O'Blasney, 297 N.W.2d 797, 798 (S.D. 1980); WAYNE R WAVE & 
AUSTIN W. SCOTT, CRIMINAL LAW 640 (2d ed. 1986); Comment, 24 RUTGERS L. REV. 
591, 59396 (1970). 
45. Roth & Sundby, supra note 35, at 45859. 
46. Id. at 460. 
47. Crump & Crump, supra note 12, at 367-78. 
48. State v. Chaney, 477 P.2d 441, 444 (Alaska 1970). 
49. Gallup PoU: High Fear of Crime, CRIME CONTROL DIG., Feb. 28, 1983, at 1, 8 
(finding that "45 percent of Americans are afraid to go out alone at night within a 
mile of their homesn). 
50. Chris E. Marshall, Fear of Crime, Community Satisfation and SeIf-Protective Meas- 
ures: Perceptiow From a Midwesta City, 14 J. CRIME &JUSL 97,101 (1991). 
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C. The Present Day Statute 
Although there are some states where the felony-murder statutes 
broadly restate the common law doctrine without any restrictions,5' 
mostjurisdictions have modified the common law rule. Some jurisdic- 
tions have mitigated the doctrine by requiring that the defendant ex- 
hibit a mens rea in addition to the mere intent to commit a felony?* 
Although New Hampshire is the only state that has adopted the Model 
Penal Code f0rmulation,5~ which provides a rebuttable presumption 
of recklessness and extreme indiieren~e,5~ other states have required 
varying degrees of intent. Delaware's homicide statute requires crimi- 
nal negligence for a first degree felony-murder charge based upon an 
enumerated felony; otherwise, the prosecution must prove reckless- 
ne~s .5~  Arkansas requires that the actor cause the death under cir- 
cumstances requiring extreme indifference to human life?6 
Tennessee requires a mens rea of reckles~ness.~' 
Other jurisdictions have mitigated the felony-murder rule by 
downgrading the offense and reducing the applicable penalty.58 
51. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. 5 16-51 (c) (Michie 1992); IOWA CODE 5 707.2 (1979); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 21-3401 (a) (Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAtvs ANN. ch. 265,s 1 (West 
1990); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 30-2-1 (A) (Michie 1984); S.C. CODE ANN. 5 16-3-10 (Law Co- 
op 1985); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 5 19.02(a) (3) (West 1989); VA. CODE ANN. 5 18.2-32 
(Michie Supp. 1993). 
52. Although the drafters of the Model Penal Code originally concluded that the 
felony-murder rule should be abandoned, concern over political opposition led them 
to insert a provision in the definition of reckless murder that states that recklessness 
and extreme indifference to human life are presumed if the actor is engaged in a 
felony-murder situation. SeeMoDEL PENAL CODE 5 210.2(1) (b) (Official Draft 1962); 
MODEL PENAL CODE 5 201.2 cmt 4 (Tent Draft No. 9 1959); Herbert Wechsler, Codzji- 
cation of Criminal Law in the United Stah: The Mo&l Penal Code, 68 COLUM. L. REV. 1425, 
1446 (1968). 
53. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 630:l-6 (1986) (effective 1974). 
54. The New Hampshire formulation provides a rebuttable presumption of reck- 
lessness in its second degree murder statute if the defendant is engaged in the com- 
mission of certain enumerated felonies. Id. 5 630:l-b. Its first degree murder statute 
requires a showing of knowledge or purpose. Id. 5 630:l-a (Supp. 1992). 
55. DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, 5 635-636 (Supp. 1992). 
56. ARK. CODE ANN. 5 510-101, 102 (Michie Supp. 1991). 
57. TENN. CODE ANN. 5 39-13202(a) (2) (1991). 
58. The majority of jurisdictions, however, still classify felony-murder as firstde- 
gree or capital murder. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 5 13A-6-2 (1982); Aruz. REV. STAT. ANN. 
5 13-1 105(A) (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. 5 510-101 (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. PENAL 
CODE 3 189 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. 5 18-3-101 (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. 
ANN. 5 53a-54c (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 5 636 (Supp. 1992); D.C. CODE 
ANN. 5 22-2401 (1991); GA. CODE ANN. 5 16-5l(c) (Michie 1992); IDAHO CODE 5 18- 
4003 (Supp. 1993); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 9, para. 9-1 (Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. 5 3 5  
42-1-1 (West Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. 5 707.2 (West 1979); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21- 
3401(a) (Supp. 1992); MASS. GEN. LAIVS ANN. ch. 265, 5 1 (West 1990); MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN. 5 750.316 (West 1991 & Supp. 1992); MISS. CODE ANN. 5 97-3-19 (Supp. 
1992); Mo. REV. STAT. 5 565.003 (1979); MONT. CODE ANN. 5 455102 (1992); NEB. 
REV. STAT. 5 28-303 (1989); NEV. REV. STAT. 5 200.030 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 2C:ll- 
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Maine and Wisconsin have classified felony-murder as third degree 
murder, with a minimum imprisonment of up to twenty years in 
Maine and fifteen years in Wisc~nsin.~~ In Ohio, felony-murder is 
treated as involuntary manslaughter with imprisonment of up to 
twenty five years.60 Oklahoma, Utah, and Idaho seem to have down- 
graded the felony murder rule through imprecise drafts mans hi^.^^ 
Legislatures have also modified the felony-murder rule by provid- 
ing an finnative defense for accomplices who did not participate in 
the acts that caused the victim's death.=* For example, the Arkansas 
statute provides the defendant with an affirmative defense if he did 
not commit the homicidal act, was not armed, reasonably believed 
that no other participant was armed, and reasonably believed that no 
other participant intended to engage in conduct that could result in a 
deatheG3 
3 (West Supp. 1992); N.M. STAT. ANN. 30-2-1(A) (Michie 1984); N.C. GEN. STAT. 
1417 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-16-01(1) (c) (1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 2903.01 (Anderson 1993); O m .  STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7 (West Supp. 1993); OR. 
REV. STAT. § 163.115 (I) (b) (1991); RI. GEN. LAWS 11-23-1 (Supp. 1992); S.C. CODE 
ANN. § 16-3-10 (Law Coop 1985); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 22-164 (Supp. 1993); 
TENN. CODE ANN. 39-13-202 (1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02 (a) (3) (West 
1989); UTAH CODE ANN. 3 76-5-203 (Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 2301 (Supp. 
1992); VA. CODE ANN. 18.2-32 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A-32- 
030 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE $j 61-2-1 (1992); WYO. STAT. 9 6-2-101 (Supp. 
1992). 
Although some states classify felony-murder as second degree murder, the penal- 
ties are still extremely harsh. See e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 782.04 (West 1992); LA. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 30.1 (West Supp. 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.185 (West Supp. 1993); 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630:l-b (1986); N.Y. PENAL AW 125.25 (McKinney 1987); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 2502(b) (1983). 
59. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, 1251 (West Supp. 1992); WIS. STAT. § 940.03 
(Supp. 1992). 
60. OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 2929.11(A) (B) (I), 2903.04 (Anderson 1993). Ohio 
also has an aggravated murder section which treats murders committed during enu- 
merated felonies as capital offenses with greater punishment. Id 2903.01(B). 
Under 2903.01(B), the required mens rea is purposell. 
61. See Alderstein, supra note 31, at 259-60; see also IDAHO CODE 18-4003 (Supp. 
1993); O m .  STAT. ANN. tit. 21,§§ 701.7, '701.8 (West. Supp. 1993); UTAH CODE ANN. 
76-5-203 (Supp. 1992). 
62. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 1141-110 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. 5 5-10-101 (Michie 
Supp. 1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 53a-54c (West 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 
17-A, 202 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:ll-3 (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL AW 
§ 125.25 (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-16-01 (1985); OR REV. STAT. 
§ 163.115 (West Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9k32.030 (West Supp. 1993). 
63. ARK. CODE. ANN. 510-104(b) (Michie 1987). For examples of other states 
whose statutes contain affirmative defenses, see COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-101 (Supp. 
1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 53a-54c (West 1985); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, 
§ 202 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3 (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL LAW 
§ 125.25 (McKinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE 12.1-16-01 (1985); OR REV. STAT. 
163.115 (Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A-32-030 (West Supp. 1993). Be- 
cause the elements of the defense are conjunctive, there is no reported decision dem- 
onstrating an accomplice who has prevailed on the defense. See Richard Cosway, The 
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Finally, the statutes of thirty-nine jurisdictions specifically enu- 
merate the felonies that must be committed to give rise to a felony- 
murder charge.64 Some examples of these felonies are arson, rape, 
robbery, and kidnapping.65 The enumerated felonies reflect the legis- 
lature's intent to deter the most dangerous and violent felonies.66 
There are other revisions that some legislatures have adopted to 
narrow the scope of the doctrine. In some codes, the victim of the 
homicide must be someone other than one of the felons.67 Other 
codes require that the death occur in the course of the felony or 
within the immediate flight from the felony, thus restricting the time 
period within which the defendant can be held liable.68 
Revised Washington Criminal Code's Vital Structure: The Bur& o f h o f ;  Felony Murk ,  and 
Justification Pr&m, 48 WASH. L. REV. 57, 76 (1972); Bernard E. Gegan, Criminal 
Homicide in the M e d  New York Penal Law, 12 N.Y.L. I?. 565, 690 (1966). 
64. ALA. CODE !j 13A-6-2 (1982); ALASKA STAT. 1141-110 (1989); ARIZ. REV. 
STAT. ANN. 5 13-1 105 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. 510-101 (Michie Supp. 1991); CAL. 
PENAL CODE 5 189 (West 1988); COLO. REV. STAT. 18-3401 (Supp. 1992); CONN. 
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54c (West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, § 636 (Supp. 1992); 
D.C. CODE ANN. 22-2401 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. !j 782-04 (West 1992); IDAHO CODE 
18-4003 (Supp. 1993); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 9, para. 9-1 (Supp. 1993); IND. CODE ANN. 
§ 35-42-1-1 (West Supp. 1992); LA REV. STAT. ANN. 30.1 (West Supp. 1993); ME. 
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, 202 (West Supp. 1992); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. 5 750.316 
(West 1991); MIS. CODE ANN. 5 97-3-19 (Supp. 1992); Mo. REV. STAT. 565.003 
(1979); MONT. CODE ANN. 5 455402 (1992); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-303 (1989); NEV. 
REV. STAT. 200.030 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:ll-3 (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW 125.25 (McKinney 198'7); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1417 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE 
5 12.1-16-01 (1985); Orak STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 701.7 (West Supp. 1993); OR REV. 
STAT. $163.1 15 (1991); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18 ,s  2502(b) (1983); RI. GEN. LAWS § 11- 
2301 (Supp. 1992), S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 5 22-164 (Supp. 1993); TENN. CODE 
ANN. 39-13-202 (1991); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5203 (Supp. 1992); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 
13, 2301 (Supp. 1992); VA CODE ANN. 5 18-2-32 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. 
CODE ANN. 5 9A-32-030 (West Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE 61-2-1 (1992); Wrs. STAT. 
ANN. 940.03 (West Supp. 1992); Wo. STAT. 5 6-2-101 (Supp. 1992). 
65. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. 5-10-101 (Michie Supp. 1991); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 
11, !J 636 (Supp. 1992); Mrs. CODE ANN. § 97-3-19 (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. 5 9A-32-030 (West Supp. 1993). 
66. Interestingly, the stated purpose of writing the underlying felonies to certain 
enumerated ones in New York was to "exclude rare instances of accidental or not 
reasonably foreseeable htality, and especially those that might happen to occur in a 
most unlikely manner in the course of a non-violent felony." STAFF NOTES OF THE 
COhfhf1SS10N ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAW, PROPOSED NEW YORK PENAL LAW 275 
(1965). Thus, the limitation seems to go towards limiting causation rather than deter- 
ring the underlying felony. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 125.25 (McKinney 1983) (Prac- 
tice Commentary). 
67. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. 5 1141-110 (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. 18-3-101 (Supp. 
1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53a-54c (West 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:ll-3 (West 
Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL LAW 125.25 (McKinney 1987); OR REV. STAT. 5 163.115 
(1991); UTAH CODE ANN. 76-5-203 (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 9A-32-030 
(West Supp. 1993). 
68. See, e.g., AUL CODE 5 13A-6-2 (1992); ALSKA STAT. § 11.41.110 (1989); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105 (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. 510-101 (Michie Supp. 1991); 
COLO. REV. STAT. 5 18-3-101 (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 53a-54c (West 
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Besides the modifications created by state legislatures, courts 
have imposed restrictions and limitations through their interpreta- 
tions of the doctrine. Some of these modifications were eventually 
adopted by the legislature as part of the statutory lang~age,6~ while 
others arise as a result of construing ambiguous lang~age.'~ There 
are also courtcreated modifications that exist in addition to the re- 
quirements of the statute?' 
Despite the strbstantial amount of criticism supporting the aboli- 
tion of the doctrine, the doctrine continues to be viable. The Model 
Penal Code has had virtually no impact on reforming the doctrine; as 
a result of piecemeal changes, state statutes are frequently ambiguous 
and inconsistent. Rather than clarifying these ambiguities, the courts 
have added to the confusion through court imposed changes and re- 
strictions. Perhaps the longevity of the doctrine is an indication of the 
current societal view towards crime and morality. Instead of abolish- 
ing the doctrine, the legislature should concentrate on creating a stat- 
ute that is unambiguous, that can be facilely construed by the courts, 
and that represents society's need to punish deserving defendants. 
Generally, crimes are divided into two elements: mens rea and 
actus reas.'* Mens rea is the mental state neede'd to complete the 
crime while actus reas is the wrongful act committed by the defend- 
1985); DEL. CODEANN. tit. 11, § 636 (Supp. 1992); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 202 
(West 1983); Mom. CODE ANN. § 455102 (1992); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 3 630:l-b 
(1986); N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 2C:ll-3 (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL AW 5 125.25 (Mc- 
Kinney 1987); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 12.1-16-01 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 163.1 15 (1991); 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 5 2502(b) (1983); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 19.02(a) (3) (West 
1989); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5203 (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.32.030 
(West Supp. 1993) (all requiring either immediate flight or in the course of the 
felony). 
69. For example, Alabama included the inherently dangerous limitation in the 
text of its statute. ALA. CODE § 13A-&2(a) (3) (1975 & Supp. 1993) (stating that a 
person who causes the death of another in the course of a felony that is inherently 
dangerous to human life commits murder). 
70. For example, compare People v. Satchell, 489 P.2d 1361 (Cal. 1971) (holding 
that the felony of possession of a concealable weapon by an ex-felon is not a felony 
inherently dangerous to human life) urith State v. Goodseal, 553 P.2d 279 (Kan. 1976) 
(holding that a jury must decide in the light of the circumstances whether the felony 
is inherently dangerous and that a convicted felon's possession of a firearm used to 
frighten a victim is a felony inherently and foreseeably dangerous to human life, 
therefore supporting a conviction of felony murder). Another example is the con- 
struction of "immediate flight." See People v. Gladman, 359 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1976) 
(holding that immediate flight is a question of fact for the jury). 
71. See Garrett v. State, 573 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1978) (holding that, in addition to 
statutory requirements, the purpose of the felony must be independent of the 
killing). 
72. See generaUy LAEAVE & Scorr, supra note 44, at 7. 
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ant?3 Where a crime requires a specific result, such as a death, the 
prosecution must also prove that the defendant caused the result.74 
The common law felony-murder doctrine generally states that if a 
death occurs in the course of the commission or attempted commis- 
sion of a felony, the defendant is guilty of homicide, even if there was 
no intent to cause the death?5 Thus, unlike traditional crimes, felony- 
murder has no mens rea requirement for the homicide as long as 
there is intent to commit the underlying felony.76 Although no mens 
rea is required for the homicide, there still must be a causal relation- 
ship between the underlying felony and the resulting homicide. 
There must be a connection (more than mere coincidence be- 
meen time and place) between the conduct and the result of the con- 
duct in order to satisfy the element of causation in any result-oriented 
crime.77 In crimes with mens rea, the conduct must have factually 
caused the result, and the forbidden result which actually occurs must 
be similar to the result or manner that the defendant intended.78 
This ensures that the defendant may fairly be held responsible for the 
actual result even if the result occurs in a diierent way than that in- 
tended by the defendant.79 In the felony-murder situation, however, 
73. Id. 
74. Id. 
75. Id. 
76. Courts have used diierent rationales to support the lack of mens rea. Some 
courts have held that the intent of the underlying felony is transferred to the intent to 
commit the murder. See Shanahan v. United States, 354 k 2 d  524,526 (D.C. 1976) 
(holding that intent is implied from the commission of the underlying felony) (citing 
Goodall v. U.S., 180 F.2d 397, 399-400 (D.C. Cir. 1950). Other courts have deter- 
mined that no intent is required. See, e.g., People v. Root, 524 F.2d 195, 198 (9th Cir. 
1975) (holding that intent to kill is not required under the felony-murder rule). 
Some courts have held that there is constructive intent. See, e.g., Commontvealth ex re1 
Smith v. Myers, 261 k 2 d  550,553 (Pa. 1970) (holding the malice necessary to make a 
killing murder is constructively inferred from the malice incident to the perpetration 
of the initial felony). See generally Note, Felony Murder: A Tort Law Recmceptualiurtion, 
99 W v .  L. REV. 1918, 1920 (1986) (comparing the absence of mens rea in felony- 
murder to tort concepts); Roth & Sundby, supfa note 35, at 453-60 (conceptualizing 
the lack of mens rea as transferred or constructive intent). 
77. People v. Mulcahy, 149 N.E. 266 (Ill. 1925). 
78. Set; e.g., State v. Hall, 633 P.2d 398 (Ariz. 1981). The felon's blows to the 
victim's head caused immobility and hospitalization. Id. at 400. Although the victim 
later died of a pulmonary embolism, this was held to be a natural consequence of 
immobilization. Id. at 40304. 
79. This scenario assumes that the required mens rea for the crime is intent. If 
the required mens rea is recklessness or negligence, then the forbidden result must 
be similar enough to and occur in a manner which the defendant's reckless or negli- 
gent conduct created a risk of happening. For further discussions of causation in 
general, SeeJE~ohlE Hw, GENERAL PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL h w  ch. 8 (2d ed. 1960); 
WAVE & SCOTT, supfa note 44, at 246-67; Sanford H. Kadish, CompliciEy, Cause and 
Blame: A Study in t h  Interpretation of Doctrine, 73 CAL. L. REV. 323 (1985); David J. Karp, 
Cawatim in the Model Penal Code, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1249 (1978); Paul K. Ryu, Causa- 
tion in Criminal h w ,  106 U. PA. L. REV. 773 (1958). 
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where intent is not required, liability for a caused death results not 
because the felon intended to kill the victim, but because he had a 
different bad intention (committing a felony) and was acting in a way 
to carry out that different intention. Thus, the causation analysis be- 
comes a little different in cases proceeding under a theory of felony- 
murder. The result of the defendant's acts can no longer be viewed in 
relation to the defendant's intent to cause that result. 
When a victim is killed during the course of a felony by one of the 
felons, the causation analysis is generally not problematic. The courts 
generally look at whether the death is a foreseeable result of the un- 
derlying felony. For example, in State v. Cas~er,*~ the court held that 
there was sufficient evidence for a felony-murder conviction when the 
victim of an attempted robbery, upon being threatened with castra- 
tion, ran into a river, where his dead body was found a few days later. 
Similarly, a defendant was found guilty of felony-murder when an eld- 
erly victim suffered a heart attack three days after an attempted rob- 
bery?' Both of these courts held that it was foreseeable that the 
defendant's conduct could lead to the victimsy deaths.82 Because the 
felon came prepared to engage in violence towards a particular victim, 
and violence in fact occurred, it does not offend principles of fairness 
to find that the felonious conduct caused the death. 
This can easily be distinguished, however, from the situation 
where someone is killed by someone other than one of the felons. In 
this scenario, it is possible that the felons did not even have a weapon 
at the time that they committed the felony?% In that situation, not 
only did the defendant not intend the result, but it is also possible that 
he did not intend the circumstances that led up to the resulting 
dealth. Consequently, one of the areas of causation in felony-murder 
cases that continues to give difficulty to both legislatures and courts is 
the question of whether to extend liability to co-felons who did not 
actually perform the act of killing. The courts have used the causation 
80. 219 N.W.2d 226 (Neb. 1974). 
81. In re Anthony M., 471 N.E.2d 447 (N.Y. 1984). 
82. State v. Casper, 219 N.W. 2d 226 (Neb. 1974); In re Anthony M., 471 N.E.2d at 
448; see also State v. Arnaro, 436 So. 2d 1056 (Ha. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (holding that a 
defendant who has already been arrested and is out of the house is criminally liable 
when a co-felon kills a police officer who is searching the house). 
83. For example, in State v. Chambers, 373 N.E.2d 393-94 (Ohio Ct. App. 1977), 
the defendant and his partner, who were both unarmed, were surprised by the owner 
of the home they were burglarizing. The owner shot and killed one of the felons as 
he attempted to escape. Id. at 394. Although Ohio does not have a felony-murder 
rule, it is involuntary manslaughter for a person to "cause the death of another as a 
proximate result of the offender's committing or attempting to commitn a felony. 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 5 2903.04(A) (Anderson 1993). The court convicted the c e  
felon for the death of his partner, concluding that the killing was a foreseeable conse- 
quence of the felony. Chambers, 373 N.E.2d at 396. 
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analysis to restrict the doctrine in these situations because of the in- 
herent injustice that could be part of a finding of liability?4 
There are many factual variations of this scenario. If the defend- 
ant and his accomplices commit a felony on a victim, the act causing 
the death can originate from the defendant, codefendant, victim, po- 
lice officer, or even an innocent bystander. That act can cause the 
death of a codefendant, victim, police officer, or an innocent by- 
~tander.8~ Some of these scenarios are less problematic than others. 
When the act causes the death of a co-felon, liability has generally not 
been extended to a surviving fel0n.8~ When the act of killing is done 
by a co-felon and results in the death of a police officer, innocent 
bystander or victim, liability has generally been extended to all of the 
co-felons?' Finally, where a victim or innocent bystander is killed be- 
cause he has been used as a shield or taken hostage by a defendant, 
liability has been extended regardless of who did the act of killing.88 
Considerable confusion and inconsistency remain in those cases 
where the act of killing is done by a police officer, victim, or innocent 
bystander, and the act results in the death of a police officer, victim, 
or innocent bystander. In determining whether there should be lia- 
bility, courts have construed felony-murder statutes according to di- 
ferent causation doctrines. Depending on which doctrine is used, the 
results of the analysis vary considerably. 
A. Statutory Language of Causation 
Although most causation analysis is common law, some states 
have dealt with causation through statutes. The threshold require- 
ment of statutory interpretation is that if a statute is unambiguous, the 
84. Chambers, 373 N.E.2d at 395. 
85. For a further discussion, see Walter H. Hitchler, The K i k  and his Victim in 
Felony-Murder Cas~ases, 53 DICK. L. REV. 3 (1948); Frederick C. Moesel, Jr., A Suruey of 
Felony Murder, 28 TEMP. L.Q. 453 (1955). 
86. Many statutes now specifically contain language that limits the doctrine to 
situations where the person kilIed is not a participant in the felony. See, e.g., ALASKA 
STAT. 5 11-41-110 (1989); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-101 (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. 
STAT. ANN. 5 53a-54c (West 1985); N.J. STAT. ANN. 5 2C:ll-3 (West Supp. 1992); N.Y. 
PENAL AW 5 125.25 (McKinney 1987); OR REV. STAT. 5 163.115(1) (b) (1991); VA. 
CODE ANN. § 18-2-32 (Michie Supp. 1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 5 9A-32-030 (West 
Supp. 1993). 
Even in states where the statutes do not contain that language, courts have held 
that a defendant is not liable for a codefendant's death under the felony-murder doc- 
trine. See, e.g., People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130,133 (Cal. 1965); People v. Austin, 
120 N.W.2d 766,775 (Mich. 1963); State v. Canola, 374 k 2 d  20,30 (N.J. 1977). 
87. See Campbell v. State, 444 k 2 d  1034 (Md. 1982) (discussing the felony-mur- 
der doctrine). 
88. See Jackson v. State, 408 k 2 d  711, 719 n.5 (Md. 1979) (stating that courts 
generally reason that the defendant's action in forcing the victim into such a danger- 
ous position is as much a cause of the death as if the defendant had actually fired the 
fatal shot) (citing Wilson v. State, 68 S.W.2d 100 (Ark. 1934)). 
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court must apply its plain meaning to resolve the question before it.89 
Thus, the easiest way to determine which causation theory to apply is 
if the statute itself clearly states the applicable requirement. 
Generally, the statutory language falls into two categories. Some 
statutes do not contain the word "cause" at all, but instead require 
that the murder be committed in the perpetration or attempted per- 
petration of certain felonies?" Other statutes contain language that 
states that a person is guilty of felony-murder when he commits or 
attempts to commit a felony, and in the course of or in furtherance of 
such crime, he causes the death of a person?' This statutory language 
neither specifies the theory of causation nor does it tell the court what 
to do in those cases where the fatal shot is fired by someone other 
than one of the defendants. 
There have been some states that have drafted statutes to specifi- 
cally explain the causation requirement. For example, the old New 
York felony-murder statute made "the killing of a human being mur- 
der in the first degree, when done without a design to effect death by 
a person engaged in the commission of or in an attempt to commit a 
felony . . . ."92 Thus, this statute, by its particular wording, seemed to 
require that the killing be committed by the defendant or a ~ o - f e l o n . ~ ~  
Another example is Maine's felony-murder statute which provides that 
a person is guilty if "acting alone or with one or more other persons in 
the commission of or attempt to commit, or immediate flight after 
committing [enumerated felonies] the person or another participant 
in fact causes the death of a human being, and the death is a reason- 
ably foreseeable consequence of such commission, attempt, or 
flight.n94 Thus, under the Maine statute, it does not matter who fired 
89. See F. REED DICKERSON, THE INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF STATUTES 
229-33 (1975); NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY C O N S T R U ~ O N  5 46.01 
(5th ed. 1992). 
90. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE 5 189 (West 1988); FLA. STAT. ANN. 5 782.04 (West 
1992); IDAHO CODE 5 18-4003 (Supp. 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. 5 21-3401(a) (Supp. 
1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 30.1 (West Supp. 1993); NEB. REV. STAT 5 28-303 (1989); 
NEV. REV. STAT. 5 200.030 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. 5 30-2-1(A) (Michie 1984); N.C. 
GEN. STAT. 5 1417 (1992); RI. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-1 (S~pp.  1992); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS 
ANN. 5 22-164 (Supp. 1993); W. VA. CODE 5 61-2-1 (1992); WYO. STAT. 5 62-101 
(Supp. 1992). 
91. See, e.g., ALA. CODE 5 13A&2 (1982); ALASKA STAT. 5 11-41-110 (1989); ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. 5 131105(A) (1989); ARK. CODE ANN. fj 510-101 (Michie Supp. 
1991); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 5 53a-54c (West 1985); D.C. CODE ANN. 5 22-2401 
(1991); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 265, 5 1 (West 1990); N.D. CENT. CODE 5 12.1-16 
Ol(1) (c) (1985); OR. REV. STAT. 3 163.115(1)(b) (1991); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 
§ 19.02 (West 1989); UTAH CODE ANN. 5 765203 (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE 
ANN. 5 9A-32-030 (West Supp. 1993). 
92. People v. Wood, 167 N.E.2d 736 (N.Y. 1960). 
93. Id. 
94. ME. REV. STAT. ANN tit  17-A, 5 202 (West Supp. 1992). The Penal Code in 
Maine also has a provision that specifically defines causation to require both factual 
causation and foreseeability. Id. 5 33. 
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the fatal shot as long as the death of the victim is reasonably 
f~reseeable?~ 
Similarly, the Colorado statute states that a person is guilty of fel- 
ony-murder if, during the course of a felony, the death of a person, 
other than one of the participants is caused by any0ne.9~ Therefore, it 
does not matter who fired the fatal shot under the Colorado statute. 
In New Jersey, the legislature specifically amended the felony- 
murder statute in response to a decision that held that a felon could 
not be liable for the death of a co-felon caused by someone resisting 
the commission of the felony?' The legislature responded by amend- 
ing the felony-murder statute to eliminate the requirement that the 
death be caused by one of the participants and provided that the re- 
quirement was satisfied if the death was caused by "any person."g8 By 
making this change, the legislature made it clear that a felon could be 
held liable under the felony-murder doctrine even if the death was 
caused by the victim. 
In 1981, the New Jersey Legislature again amended the felony- 
murder rule by deleting the requirement that the death occur in fur- 
therance of the commission of the felony?' As explained by the Sen- 
ate Judiciary Committee, the legislature was concerned that the "in 
furtherance" language might result in a felon avoiding liability if the 
death was caused by a non-participant such as a victim or police 
officer.'OO Thus, the purpose of the amendments was to ensure 
95. State v. Reardon, 486 k 2 d  112 (Me. 1984). 
96. COLO. REV. STAT. 5 18-3-102 l(b) (Supp. 1993). But see sources cited supra 
note 86 and accompanying text 
97. State v. Canola, 374 k 2 d  20 (NJ. 1977). In Canola, four felons attempted to 
rob a jewelry store. Id. During the course of the robbery, the owner killed one of the 
felons and then was killed himself. Id. at 21. The defendant was convicted of felony- 
murder of both the owner and the co-felon. Id. The appellate division affirmed the 
conviction and the New Jersey Supreme Court reversed, holding that a felon could 
not be liable for any death, even of a non-felon, when the death was caused by some- 
one other than a participant in the felony. Id at 30. Thus, Canola limits the felony- 
murder rule to killings committed by a participating felon. 
98. State v. Martin, 573 k 2 d  1359 (N.J. 1990) (construing the legislative 
amendments). 
99. Id. at  1371. 
100. The committee statement that accompanied the amendment reads: 
Under 2C:ll-3, a person committing a serious crime (i.e. robbery or 
arson) is guilty of murder if during the course of or in furtherance of that 
crime a homicide occurs. This is what is commonly referred to as the "fel- 
ony-murder" doctrine. The felony-murder provision is only intended to pro- 
hibit murder prosecutions in cases where the victim is a co-felon. However, 
including in this definition the phrase "in furtherance OF could be read to 
preclude prosecution for murder in certain circumstances. For instance, 
when during a robbery, the shopkeeper fires at the robber but instead kills 
an innocent bystander, the robber might not be charged with murder be- 
cause, although the killing occurred during the course of the robbery, the 
killing was not in furtherance of the robbely. Therefore, in order to clarify 
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that the felony-murder rule applies regardless of who fires the fatal 
shot.lO' 
Additionally, New Jersey's Penal Code includes a statutory defini- 
tion of causation.lo2 Although the felony-murder statute does not de- 
fine causation, the New Jersey court has held that the penal code 
defines causation not only for intentional homicide, but for all crimes 
including felony-murder.lo3 According to the statute, the causation 
element is not established unless the actual result is a probable conse- 
quence of the actor's conduct.lo4 The court has interpreted that lan- 
guage to require the prosecution to prove that the death occurred in 
the course of the crime, that the death would not have occurred but 
for the crime, and that the death is not too remote or accidental in its 
occ~rrence. '~~ 
Thus, jurisdictions have used diierent statutory language to de- 
fine the parameters of the causation doctrine under the felony-mur- 
der rule. In many jurisdictions, however, the statute is silent with 
respect to how a nonparticipant killing of an innocent party should be 
addressed. The courts have therefore used various theories of causa- 
tion to resolve that question. 
that a robber could be charged with murder under such circumstances, sec- 
tion 14 would delete the phrase "in furtherance of" from 2C:ll-3. 
Id (quoting SENATE JUDICIARY C O M M ~ E ,  STATEMENT TO SENATE COMM. SU-,
No. 1537, § 14 (1981)). 
101. Many states have helpful information about the way that the felony-murder 
statute should be interpreted in the Committee comments. See, e.g., Aruz. REV. STAT. 
ANN. 5 13-203 (1989); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 261 (1987); HAW. REV. STAT. § 702- 
214 (1985); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 501.060 (Michie/Bobbs-Meml1990); Mom. CODE 
ANN. !j 45-2-201 (1992); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C2-3 (West Supp. 1992); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 
18, 5 302 (1983). 
102. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C2-3 (West Supp. 1992). 
103. Martin, 573 k 2 d  at 1371-72. That reasoning is also supported by a 1985 addi- 
tion to the Model Penal Code commentary on section 2.03(4), which states that: 
The most important application [of the causation requirement] may be in 
jurisdictions where strict liability continues to play a role in determining the 
gravity of some offenses. Under the felony-murder rule, for example, a per- 
son committing a felony is strictly liable for deaths caused during the felony. 
The principle of this subsection is that there should be no liability unless the 
actual result is a probable consequence of the actor's conduct. Thus, s u p  
pose the moment a bank robber stepped into the bank, an employee push- 
ing the button for a burglar alarm was electrocuted. The robber would not 
be liable for the death of the employee. 
In general, strict liability is based on a desire to secure extreme care in 
areas in which it is imposed. This objective is not significantly furthered by 
finding liability for improbable results, nor would such an approach be just. 
Id at 1371-72 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE 2.03(4) cmt. at 264 (1985)). 
104. N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C2-3 (West Supp. 1992). 
105. Martin, 573 A.2d at 1364. 
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1. Agency Themy 
Although courts have used the agency theory as a theory of causa- 
tion, it really rests on the act requirement.lo6 The agency theory, bor- 
rowed from principles of conspiracy, is based on the premise that co- 
conspirators are only responsible for acts done in furtherance of the 
conspiracy, and not for those act committed outside the common de- 
sign. The premise was extended to the felony-murder doctrine, result- 
ing in the conclusion that there can be no liability unless the act 
causing the death is an act of one of the felons that occurs in further- 
ance of the felony. Accordingly, under this theory, neither a defend- 
ant nor his confederates can be liable if the act of killing is done by a 
police officer, innocent bystander, or victim. The identity of the killer 
becomes the threshold requirement for finding liability under the fel- 
ony-murder doctrine.lo7 
Courts that have adopted the agency theory have done so based 
on different rationales. For example, in State v. Carnpbel&lo8 a co-felon 
was killed during an armed robbery by nine bullet wounds, two that 
were inflicted by the victim and seven that were inflicted by a police 
officer.log The Maryland felony-murder statute provided that "all 
murder which shall be committed in the perpetration of, or attempt 
to perpetrate . . . armed robbery . . . shall be murder in the first de- 
gree."'1° The court held that no criminal liability could be imputed 
to the surviving felon when the lethal act was committed by a non- 
felon.lll The court reasoned that the statute required that the killing 
be committed in the perpetration of the felony and that the language 
of the statute dictated that the act be committed by a felon or one of 
106. Moesel, supra note 85, at 461. A classic statement of the agency theory ap- 
pears in Commonwealth v. Campbell, 89 Mass. 541 (1863). The defendant was partic- 
ipating in a riot. Id. The issue was whether under the felony-murder doctrine, the 
defendant could be guilty of murder if another person was killed by a soldier who was 
resisting the mob's attack. Id  at 54546. The court held: 
There can be no doubt of the general rule of law, that a person engaged in 
the commission of an unlawful act is legally responsible for all of the conse- 
quences which may naturally or necessarily flow from it, and that, if he com- 
bines and confederates with others to accomplish an illegal purpose he is 
liable . . . for the acts of each and all who participate with him . . . . As they 
all act in concert for a common object, each is the agent for all the others, 
and the acts done are therefore the acts of each and all. . . . [N]o person can 
be held guilty of homicide unless the act is either actually or constructively 
his, and it cannot be his act in either sense unless committed by his own 
hand or by some one acting in concert with him . . . ." 
Id. at 54344. 
107. Moore v. Wyrick, 766 F.2d 1253, 1255 (8th Cir. 1985). 
108. 444 k 2 d  1034 (Md. 1981). 
109. Id. at 1036. 
110. Id. 
111. Id. at 1037. 
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his confederates."* Because this killing was committed to thwart the 
felony and not to perpetrate it, the felony-murder statute did not 
apply.l13 
In a case involving similar facts, a California court also refused to 
extend liability to a defendant when a co-felon was killed by a victim 
during the course of an attempted robbery.'14 Again, the court rea- 
soned that the felony-murder statute requires that the felon or an ac- 
complice commit the killing; otherwise, the killing does not 
perpetrate the felony. "To include such killings within section 189 
would expand the meaning of the words 'murder. . . which is commit- 
ted in the perpetration. . . [of] robbery' beyond common understand- 
ing."'15 The court specifically stated, however, that it did not make 
this finding based on the identity of the person who fired the fatal 
shot.l16 Instead, the court recast the issue as whether a defendant can 
be convicted of murder for the killing of any person by another who is 
resisting the felony.''' 
In Alvera v. District Court ofDenver,l18 a Colorado court applied 
the agency theory, but based the application of the theory on a differ- 
ent rationale. In Alvera, a police officer, mistaking the victim for one 
of the robbers, killed him with a shotgun blast to the head.llg The 
Colorado felony-murder statute provides that a person is guilty of 
112. Id. at 1042. 
113. Id. at 1038. 
114. People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130 (Cal. 1965). 
115. Id. at 133. But Caliiornia has created a unique kind of vicarious liability 
called provocative act murder to find liability when a killing is committed by a 
nonfelon. Id. at 134. In a series of cases, the Caliiornia courts have held that a de- 
fendant may be vicariously liable for the lethal acts of someone resisting the felony if 
the defendant, by engaging in conduct that is likely to kill, acts with conscious disre- 
gard for human lie. Id. This mle was first enunciated in Washington, where the rob- 
bery victim killed one of the felons. Id. at 132. Although the court held that the 
felony-murder rule did not apply, the court determined that a defendant who initiates 
a gun battle may be found liable for murder if his victims resist and someone is killed. 
Id. at 134. Under these circumstances, the defendant has shown a "'wanton disregard 
for human lie. . .'" Id. (quoting People v. Thomas, 261 P.2d 1 ,7  (Cal. 1953)); see also 
People v. Gilbert, 408 P.2d 365 (Cal. 1965), vacated on othergrounds, Gilbert v. Califor- 
nia, 388 U.S. 263 (1967). 
In Taylor v. Superior Court, 477 P.2d 131 (Cal. 1970), the court extended the 
scope of this theory by holding that threats alone can be sufficient to hold a defend- 
ant liable for a killing committed by a resisting victim. If felons initiate gunfire by 
their threatening conduct, they can be vicariously liable for a resulting death. Id. at 
135. This approach seems to be more of a change in terminology than a departure 
from the felony-murder doctrine. In discussing the California approach, a Nevada 
court noted a trial court's observation that a "rose, the felony murder rule, is still a 
rose by any other name, vicarious liability." Sheriff v. Hicks, 506 P.2d 766, 768 n.7 
(Nev. 1973). 
116. Washington, 402 P.2d at 134. 
117. Id. 
118. 525 P.2d 1131 (Colo. 1974) (en banc). 
119. Id.at1131. 
Heinonline - -  71 U. Det. Mercy 242 1993-1994 
19941 IWOSE CRIME IS IT ANYWAY? 243 
murder when he "commits or attempts to commit. . . robbery. . . and 
in the course of or in furtherance of the crime . . . or of immediate 
flight therefrom . . . the death of a person, other than one of the 
participants, is caused . . . ."120 The trial court held that where a par- 
ticipant mistakenly kills a nonparticipant during the course of a fel- 
ony, the perpetrators of the felony are criminally responsible.l2l The 
Colorado Supreme Court reversed, holding that the act of killing 
must be committed by a felon or co-fe10n.l~~ 
The court concluded that the statutory language failed to desig- 
nate who must cause the death for criminal liability to attach.123 The 
court looked to legislative history and determined that the legislative 
intent was to narrow the application of the rule.124 The court rea- 
soned that the new statute was identical in meaning to its predecessor 
and that felony-murder was therefore to remain limited to killings by 
one of the parti~ipants.'~~ The dissent, however, noted that the statu- 
tory language is in plain English and argued that the wording s u p  
ports only one conclusion: Who does the killing is irrelevant as long 
as there is proximate cause.126 
Thus, even when the court articulates a diierent rationale for 
using the agency theory, the reasoning still seems to be based on an 
interpretation of the old felony-murder statute that requires that the 
killing occur in the perpetration of the felony. The effect, however, of 
applying the agency theory is that the state must prove as a threshold 
matter that the defendant, or an accomplice, actually killed the victim. 
If the state cannot establish this element, the defendant cannot be 
found guilty of felony-murder.127 
120. Id. at 1132. 
121. Id. at 1131. 
122. Id. at 1132. 
123. Id. 
124. Id. 
125. Id. 
126. Id. at 1134. 
127. The Pennsylvania courts first provided insight into the problems associated 
with the two theories of causation. In Commonwealth v. Almeida, 68 k 2 d  595 (Pa. 
1949), cert. dm24 339 U.S. 924 (1950), a police officer was killed by a bullet which 
may have been fired by another police officer. Based on the proximate cause theory, 
the court held that the felon was guilty of murder because the killing was a natural 
consequence of the robbely. Id. at 601. In Commonwealth v. Thomas, 117 k 2 d  204 
(Pa. 1955), the court continued to extend the felon's liability, holding a felon liable 
for the death of a cufelon who was killed by the intended victim. The court reasoned 
that the death of a cufelon was just as foreseeable as the death of an innocent by- 
stander. Id. at 206. 
In Commonwealth v. Redline, 137 k 2 d  472 (Pa. 1958), the court overruled 
Thomas, holding that the rule enunciated in Almeih does not apply when the person 
killed is a cufelon. The court based its decision on the reasoning that because the 
killing of the cufelon was justifiable, it could not support a charge of murder. Id. at 
483. Finally, in Commonwealth v. Myers, 261 k 2 d  550 (Pa. 1970), the court over- 
ruled Almeida and adopted the agency theory of liability. In rejecting the reasoning 
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2. Proximate Causation 
Another theory of causation is borrowed from tort law. Under 
the tort concept of proximate ~ausat ion, '~~ the defendant must have 
a duty to the plaintiff, the risk must be the actual or a "but for" cause 
of the result, and the risk must be fore~eeab1e.l~~ An intervening or 
superseding event can break the chain of causation, absolving the de- 
fendant from liability.130 Courts that have applied these tort concepts 
in the criminal context have used various combinations. 
Some courts have found liability in felony-murder cases in the 
absence of foreseeability, based only on "but for" causation. While 
this approach has been given different names, such as "cause in fact," 
the test is the same: But for the defendant's act, the death would not 
have occurred.131 In Wa& v. State of Oklahoma,132 the defendant was 
convicted of second degree murder under an Oklahoma statute that 
imposes liability when a person effects the death of any individual 
while engaged in the commission of certain felonies not enumerated 
in the first degree murder statute. In upholding the conviction, the 
court held that under the felony-murder doctrine, the state is not re- 
quired to establish that the felony perpetrated by the defendant is the 
proximate cause of the victim's death.133 The only limitation on the 
enunciated in Redline, the court held that "to make the result hinge on the character 
of the victim is, in many instances, to make it hinge on the marksmanship of resister." 
Id. at 558. 
Numerous other jurisdictions have followed the agency theory and refused to 
extend liability to a felon if it could not be proven that the defendant fired the Fatal 
shot. See Commonwealth v. Balliro, 209 N.E.2d 308 (Mass. 1965) (felon found not 
guilty where it could not be prove who fired the fatal bullet); Butler v. People, 18 N.E. 
338 (Ill. 1888) (felon found not guilty even though rowdy conduct resulted in the 
killing of bystander by the town marshall). But see People v. Hickman, 319 N.E.2d 51 1 
(Ill. 1974), cert. h i e d ,  421 U.S. 913 (1975) (felon held liable for death of police of- 
ficer shot accidentally by another police officer); Commonwealth v. Moore, 88 S.W. 
1085 (Ky. 1905) (felon not guilty where victim of robbery killed a bystander); State v. 
Oxedine, 122 S.E. 568 (N.C. 1924) (felon not guilty where victim of assault killed a 
bystander). 
128. For an indepth discussion, see Note, supra note 76, at 1918. 
129. W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER & KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS $5 42,43, 
at 272-74 (5th ed. 1984). 
130. Id. 5 42, at 273-75. 
131. LaFave and Scott describe cause in fact as "'but for' the antecedent conduct 
the result would not have occurred." MAVE & Scorn, supra note 44, at 279. Compare 
State v. Wiley, 698 P.2d 1244, 1259 (Ariz. 1985) (holding that defendant's act was an 
act "but for" which the death would not have occurred); People v. Bowman, 669 P.2d 
1369,1379 (Colo. 1983) (holding that defendant's act of committing arson was an act 
, 
"but for" which death of fireman would not have occurred). The problem with "but 
for" causation is that it is always present since the outcome without the defendant's 
conduct is impossible to predict. For a discussion of causation issues in relation to 
cases involving drug overdoses, see Lynne H. Rambo, Note, An Unconstitutional Fiction: 
The FelonpMur& Rule as Awied  to the Supply of Drugs, 20 GA. L. REV. 671 (1986). 
132. 581 P.2d 914 (Okla. Crim. App. 1978). 
133. Id. at 915. 
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doctrine is that there must be a nexus between the underlying felony 
and the death of the victim.134 
In People v. Stamp,13* a robbery victim died of a heart attack twenty 
minutes after the defendants committed the crime. The defendants 
argued on appeal that the felony-murder doctrine was inapplicable 
because the killing did not occur in perpetration of the fe10ny.l~~ 
Although the jury was instructed on the definition of proximate 
cause,13' the appellate court specifically stated: 
The [felony-murder] doctrine is not limited to deaths which 
are foreseeable. . . . As long as the homicide is the direct 
causal result of the robbery the felony-murder rule applies 
whether or not the death was a natural or probable conse- 
quence of the robbery. So long as the victim's predisposing 
physical condition, regardless of its cause, is not the only sub- 
stantial factor bringing about his death, that condition, and 
the robber's ignorance of it, in no way destroys the robber's 
criminal responsibility for the death.138 
Many courts, however, have required both "but for" causation 
and "foreseeability." In State v. Moore,139 a Missouri court examined 
whether the defendant could be liable under the felony-murder doc- 
trine for the death of an innocent bystander who was killed by an 
intended victim who was attempting to abort an armed robbery. The 
defendant argued on appeal that the felony-murder rule requires a 
finding that the defendant or an accomplice fired the fatal shot.140 
The felony-murder statute in effect at the time provided that "every 
homicide which shall be committed in the perpetration or attempt to 
perpetrate any . . . robbery . . . shall be deemed murder in the first 
degree. 9 ' 1 4 1  
Although precedent seemed to indicate that Missouri followed 
the agency theory, the court adopted the causation theory of proxi- 
134. Id. at916. 
135. 82 Cal. Rptr. 598 (Cal. Ct. App. 1969), cert. h i e d  sub nom, 400 U.S. 819 
(1970). 
136. Stamp, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 598. 
137. The court stated in its instructions to the jury: 
To constitute a felonious homicide there must be, in addition to the 
death of a human being, an unlawful act which proximately caused that 
death. 
The proximate cause of death is that cause which, in natural and contin- 
uous sequence, unbroken by any efficient intervening cause, produces the 
death, and without which the result would not have occurred. 
Id. at 603 n.4. The defendant objected to the instruction. I d  at 600. 
138. I d  at 603 (citations omitted). 
139. 580 S.W.2d 747 (Mo. 1979) (en banc). 
140. Id. at 750. 
141. Id.; Mo. REV. STAT. § 559.010 (1969) (repealed September 28, 1975). 
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mate cause.142 The court held that the test is whether the homicide is 
a natural and proximate result of which the defendant was reasonably 
bound to anticipate.143 If the felony sets in motion a chain of events 
that were or should have been within the defendant's contemplation 
at the time the act was instigated, then it is immaterial whether the 
defendant fired the fatal b~1 le t . l~~  The court in Mome found that it 
was reasonably foreseeable that a robbery attempt would meet resist- 
a n ~ e . l ~ ~  This set in motion the chain of events that caused the death 
of the victim.146 Therefore, the conviction was affirmed.14' 
Thus, depending on which approach the courts use, factually sim- 
ilar cases will produce very different results. In those states where the 
felony-murder statute has been interpreted as embracing the proxi- 
mate cause theory of causation, liability is not precluded even if the 
defendant or an accomplice did not kill the victim. The state is not 
required to prove the identity of the killer, but still must prove that 
the felon's actions set in motion a chain of events that directly led to a 
foreseeable death. Under the proximate cause theory, therefore, a 
defendant can sometimes be held liable even when the shot is fired by 
a victim, police officer, or bystander, and the death occurs to a victim, 
police officer, or bystander.148 
142. State v. Moore, 580 S.W.2d 747,751 (Mo. 1979). 
143. Id. at 752. 
144. Id at 751 (citing Johnson v. State, 386 P.2d 336 (Okla. Crim. App. 1963)). 
145. Id. at 752. 
146. Id. 
147. Following his conviction, the defendant sought habeas corpus relief on the 
grounds that the Missouri state court-retroactively applied a new and expansive con- 
struction of the Missouri felony-murder statute when it followed the proximate cause 
theory of causation. Moore v. Wyrick, 766 F.2d 1253-54 (8th Cir. 1985). The circuit 
court held that the change in law was constitutionally unforeseeable and could not be 
applied retroactively. Id. at 1258. Thus, the defendant's petition was granted. Id. at 
1259. 
148. The proximate cause theory has been used by some courts in determining 
whether a felon can be liable under the felony-murder doctrine even when the fatal 
shot comes from the hands of a third party. For example, in People v. Hickman, 319 
N.E.2d 511 (Ill. 1974), a police officer was shot by a fellow police officer during the 
course of police pursuit of the defendants, who were fleeing the scene of a burglary. 
The court looked at the wording of the felony-murder statute, which stated that "[a] 
person who kills an individual without lawful justification commits murder if, in per- 
forming the acts which cause the death: . . . [h]e is attempting to commit a forcible 
felony." Id. at 512. The court referred to the committee notes to that section, which 
stated that it is immaterial whether the killing is committed by a third party trying to 
prevent the commission of the felony. Id. at 512-13. 
The court held that based on Illinois statutory and case law, it did not matter who 
fired the fatal shot as long as the resulting death is foreseeable. I d  at 513-14 Because 
it is foreseeable that an escape will invite "retaliation, opposition and pursuit," the 
defendant could be liable for murder. I d  at 513; see also People v. Allen, 309 N.E.2d 
544 (Ill. 1974) (affirming the murder conviction of a conspirator for the slaying of a 
police officer when the police officer was killed by another police officer). 
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Under the agency theory of causation, however, there can be no 
liability unless there is proof beyond a reasonable doubt that the shot 
that killed the victim was fired by the defendant or an accomplice. 
Thus, where it is unclear who fired the fatal shot, liability for the mur- 
der can never be imputed on to the defendant. The prosecution must 
prove, as a threshold matter, the identity of the killer; for without that 
information, the jury cannot examine the question of causation. 
The present trend seems to be for courts to use the agency theory 
to limit criminal culpability under the felony-murder doctrine to le- 
thal acts committed by the felons themselves or their accomplices.149 
Thus, courts in several jurisdictions have appeared to abandon the 
proximate cause theory in favor of the agency theory.150 
The result of these divergent approaches is that the liability of a 
defendant depends not only on the state in which the defendant is 
tried, but also on the court within that state. This is an unsatisfactory 
result because the courts are using the agency theory of causation to 
restrict the application of the felony-murder rule in a way that is not 
necessarily consistent with principles of statutory analysis, societal 
views about crime, and general criminal law principles. 
The next section discusses the need for a more uniform approach 
towards causation in felony-murder cases, and the last section pro- 
poses such a method. The methodology balances the need to prevent 
unfettered application of the felony-murder doctrine with the need 
for a careful, consistent analysis that provides the most just result. 
The felony-murder rule is statutory. Yet, courts retain a powerful 
role in interpreting and applying the rule because of imprecise lan- 
guage and the drafters' inability to anticipate different factual scena- 
149. One reason for refusing to extend the felony-murder doctrine is that it would 
not achieve the underlying purpose of the rule. People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130, 
133 (Cal. 1965). Another reason is that some courts feel that the tort liability concept 
of proximate cause has no place in the criminal context because of the difference in 
the underlying rationales of tort law and proximate cause. State v. Canola, 374 k 2 d  
20,30 (N.J. 1977). The theory of proximate cause can be modified, however, so that 
it provides a closer and more direct causal connection, thus in keeping with the diier- 
ences in the rationales. 
150. Compare State v. Burton, 325 k 2 d  856,858-59 (N.J. Super Ct. Law Div. 1974) 
(proximate cause) with Canola, 374 k 2 d  at 22, 29 (agency); and Commonwealth v. 
Thomas, 117 k 2 d  204 (Pa. 1955) (proximate cause) with Commonwealth v. Redline, 
137 k 2 d  472 (Pa. 1958) (agency, overruling Thomas); and Commonwealth v. Almeida, 
68 k 2 d  595, 601-10 (Pa. 1949), cert. ah24 339 U.S. 924 (1950) (proximate cause) 
with Commonwealth v. Myers, 261 k 2 d  550, 555-57 (Pa. 1970) (agency, overruling 
Almeia'u). But compare People v. Garippo, 127 N.E. 75, 77-78 (Ill. 1920) (agency) with 
Hickman, 319 N.E.2d at 513 (proximate cause, overruling Garippo); and State v. Ma- 
jors, 237 S.W. 486,488 (No. 1922) (agency) with Moore, 580 S.W.2d at 752 (proximate 
cause, overruling Majm) . 
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rios that come within its parameters.l5' The causation requirement 
and its application to the factual scenario of a nonparticipant killing a 
nonparticipant involves both of these problems. The courts have re- 
sponded to these difficulties in various ways, often leading to inconsis- 
tent and faulty conclusions. 
It is submitted that the true reasons for the confusion is the dis- 
satisfaction with the felony-murder doctrine, and the courts' use of 
the agency theory of causation as a means of limiting the doctrine. 
This limitation distorts the felony-murder doctrine's requirement of 
causation. Unless the statute is specifically written to require that a 
felon fire the fatal shot, courts should use a modified theory of proxi- 
mate cause to keep the doctrine within bounds. To illustrate the 
problem, this section will examine the ways that the causation require- 
ment has been interpreted under the New York felony-murder statute. 
New York courts have been unable to reach a consistent view on 
whether the felony-murder statute should be interpreted as embrac- 
ing the agency theory or the proximate cause theory. For example, 
the case of People v. Wood152 has frequently been cited for the proposi- 
tion that New York follows the agency theory.153 In Wood, a gun battle 
outside a tavern resulted in the deaths of a bystander and a co- 
fe10n.l~~ Shots were fired by the victim in an effort to assist the police 
0E3cer.l~~ The felony-murder statute in effect at the time stated that 
"the killing of a human being . . . is murder in the first degree, when 
committed . . . without a design to effect death, by a person engaged 
in the commission of, or in an attempt to commit, a felony."156 The 
court of appeals upheld dismissal of the indictment, holding that the 
legislature intended that the act of killing must be committed by one 
of the felons for the felony-murder doctrine to apply.15' The court 
relied in part on the "peculiar wordingn of the statute to conclude that 
the word "person" must be a principal in the underlying felony.I5' 
In 1965, the New York revised its felony-murder statute. It now 
provides that a person is guilty of second degree murder when "acting 
alone or with one or more other persons, he commits or attempts to 
151. "Statutes as well as constitutional provisions at times embody purposeful am- 
biguity or are expressed with a generality for future unfolding." Justice Felix Frank- 
furter, Some Reflectim on the Reading ofstatuta, 47 COLUM. L. REV. 527, 528 (1947). 
152. 167 N.E.2d 736 (N.Y. 1960). 
153. For cases within New York, see People v. Matos, 568 N.Y.S.2d 683, 686 (N.Y. 
Sup. Ct. 1991); People v. Lewis, 444 N.Y.S.2d 1003, 1005 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1981); People 
v. Ozarowski, 344 N.E.2d 370, 375 (N.Y. 1976); People v. Jayner, 257 N.E.2d 26, 27 
(N.Y. 1970). For cases outside of New York, see Alvarez v. District Court of Denver, 
525 P.2d 1131-32 (Colo. 1974); Campbell v. State, 444 k 2 d  1034, 1039 (Md. 1984). 
154. Wood, 167 N.E.2d at 737. 
155. Id. at 738. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. at 740. 
158. Id. 
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commit [enumerated felonies] and in furtherance of such crime or of 
immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant, if there be 
any, causes the death of a person other than one of the partici- 
p a n t ~ . " ' ~ ~  Since the revision, the New York courts have been split on 
whether the agency theory or the proximate cause theory applies. 
This split has led to inconsistent results in the lower courts. 
In People v. Ouraj,lGO shots fired during a robbery resulted in the 
victim's death. It could not be determined if the shots were fired by 
the defendant or another victim.16' The court held that the present 
statute requires the state to prove that the defendant fired the shot 
under the agency theory.16* Similarly, in People v. Rarno~'~~ the victim 
was killed during a burglary. It was unclear whether the defendant or 
the victim's wife fired the fatal shot.164 The court held that the de- 
fendant must actually commit the homicidal act for the felony-murder 
statute to a ~ p 1 y . l ~ ~  
Other courts, however, have held that the felony-murder statute 
requires proximate cause. In People v. FLrne~,'~~ a police officer was 
killed during a high speed chase following a robbery. No witnesses 
saw the actual crash nor was there any evidence of contact between 
the defendant's vehicle and the police car.'67 Construing the element 
of causation under the felony-murder statute, the court held that the 
defendant's action must be found to be '"a sufficiently direct cause of 
[the ensuing] death.'"'68 The ultimate harm does not have to be in- 
tended by the actor.'69 It is enough if the ultimate harm is something 
that should have been foreseen as being reasonably related to the acts 
of the defendant.170 The court held that although the defendant did 
bring into motion a chain of events that led to the death of the police 
officer, there was no affirmative act by the defendant that directly 
caused the accident because there was no evidence of contact between 
the vehicles.17' In addition, there were factors such as the condition 
of the road that were considered to be a superseding event breaking 
159. N.Y. PENAL AW 5 125.25(3) (McKinney 1991). 
160. 431 N.Y.S.2d 925 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1980). 
161. Id. at 926. 
162. Id. 
163. 496 N.Y.S.2d 443 (N.Y. App. Div. 1986). 
164. Id. at 444. 
165. Id. 
166. 476 N.Y.S.2d 478 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1984). 
167. Id. at 480. 
168. Id. (quoting People v. Kibbe, 321 N.E.2d 773 (N.Y. 1974)). In Kibbe, the 
homicide was prosecuted under a theory of depraved indifference to human life, not 
felony-murder. Kibbie, 321 N.E.2d at 776. Nevertheless, the I.Yoes court held that the 
analysis of proximate causation is the same as felony-murder. Id. 
169. Fibres, 476 N.Y.S. 2d at 480. 
170. Id. 
171. Id. at 481. 
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the chain of ~ausati0n.l~~ Thus, the felony-murder charges against 
the defendant were di~missed."~ 
In People v. ma to^,"^ a police officer was killed while pursuing the 
defendant following a robbery. The police officer either fell or was 
pushed over a roof during the chase.175 The defendant was charged 
with felony-murder for the death of the police 0ffi~er.l'~ The court 
applied a two-prong test of causation: first, the defendant's conduct 
must be an actual cause of death,177and, second, the death must be a 
reasonably foreseeable consequence of the defendant's a ~ t i 0 n . l ~ ~  
The court found that the element of causation was satisfied in this 
case.179 
The court also specifically stated that the applicable causation 
analysis is that applied in all other homicide cases.lsO In distinguish- 
ing Ramos and the agency theory of causation, the court stated that 
the cases were factually different because there was no evidence here 
that anyone other than the defendant could have caused the police 
officer to fall.lsl The court also noted that Wood had been decided 
under the old felony-murder statute with its 'Lpeculiar wording," and 
that the revised statute rejected that wording in favor of general lan- 
guage of causation.lS2 Thus, the court concluded that because the 
facts did not involve a death caused by anyone other than the felon, 
neither Ramos nor Wood app1ied.ls3 Instead, this case was governed by 
ordinary rules of causation.lS4 The court further opined that in view 
of the new penal code, a felon can be guilty of murder even if he did 
not shoot the fatal bullet if he sets into motion a chain of events that 
leads to death.ls5 
Finally, in People v. Hernandfds6 the court rejected the defend- 
ant's reliance on Wood where a police officer was killed in a gun battle. 
Although it could not be determined who had fired the fatal shot, the 
court refused to dismiss the felony-murder charge.ls7 The court spe- 
cifically held that Wood interpreted the predecessor statute and that in 
adopting the new statute the legislature specifically deleted all lan- 
- -- -- - - 
Id. 
Id. 
568 N.Y.S.2d 683 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1991). 
Id. at 684. 
Id. 
Id. at 685. 
Id. 
Id. at 687. 
Id. 
Id. at 686. 
Id. at 687. 
Id. 
Id. 
Id. 
588 N.Y.S.2d 567 (N.Y. App. Div. 1992). 
Id. at 569. 
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guage that could be interpreted as the agency theory.ls8 The court 
applied the ordinary rules of proximate causation, finding that it was 
foreseeable that a bullet could go astray during a gun battle in a resi- 
dential building.1sg In holding that the plain words of the statute re- 
quire a finding of proximate cause, the court held that as long as the 
defendant "sets in motion [the] machinery which ultimately results in 
the victim's death," the defendant can be liable.lgO 
Thus, the New York courts have reached diiering opinions on 
the applicability of Wood and the agency theory of causation.lgl If the 
agency theory is applied to that group of cases where the act of killing 
is done by someone other than the defendant or one of his cohorts, 
there can never be any liability imposed for the death of the victim, 
police officer, or innocent bystander. The proximate cause theory, on 
the other hand, allows liability as long as the defendant sets into mo- 
tion a chain of events that leads to a foreseeable death. As the New 
York courts seem to be realizing, this approach is more fair and is in 
keeping with both statutory interpretation and the policies underlying 
the felony-murder doctrine. 
188. Id. 
189. Id. 
190. Id. 
191. The Florida courts have also had dicul ty  in determining what causation 
theory to apply. There are Florida cases which hold that a killing need not actually be 
done by any of the perpetrators in order to support a felony-murder charge. See 
Hornbeck v. State, 77 So. 2d 876 (Fla. 1955) (police officer shot by either robber or 
fellow officer); G f i t h  v. State, 171 So. 2d 597 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1965) (bystander 
shot by robbery victim). But see State v. Andreu, 222 So. 2d 449 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 
1969) (police officer shot by fellow police officer held not to be felony-murder). 
In Florida v. Williams, 254 So.2d 548 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1971), the court re- 
viewed a case where a codefendant was killed while committing arson. Although the 
court held that the surviving defendant could not be held liable for the death of his 
accomplice, it held that the felony-murder statute is applicable when an innocent 
person is killed as a result of circumstances set in motion by one or more persons 
acting in furtherance of an intent to commit one of the felonies in the statute. Id at 
551. Because the facts of William did not involve an innocent person, the defendant 
could not be liable under the felony-murder doctrine. Id. The court, however, stated, 
in dicta, that the proximate cause theory achieves the most equitable result, while the 
agency theory appears unduly to limit the scope of the felony-murder concept. Id. 
The dissent went even further, arguing that the defendant should be liable for a code- 
fendant's death under the statute, as long as the death is foreseeable. Id. at 555 
(Pierce, CJ., dissenting). In 1975, the Florida Legislature redefined second degree 
felony murder, creating a new offense under which all principals, whether present or 
absent, are culpable for any killings which are committeed during the felony by non- 
participants in the felony. Florida v. Dene, 533 So. 2d 265 (Fla. 1988). Thus, second 
degree felony murder requires that the killing be done by a nonprincipal. Id. at 269. 
See also Webster v. State, 540 So. 2d 124 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1989). 
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Because most of the felony-murder statutes that are in effect to- 
day are not clear on the requirement of causation, courts must use the 
rules of statutory interpretation to ascertain the meaning of the stat- 
ute.lg2 Although "any conflict between the legislative will and the ju- 
dicial will must be resolved in favor of the former,"lg3 statutory 
interpretation is not a mechanical application of rules.lg4 Because 
much of statutory interpretation is discretionary, the courts' approach 
to statutory interpretation is very important. 
There are certain principles that underlie the rules of statutory 
interpretation. First, the rules help to ensure that the proper distribu- 
'tion of power between the courts and the legislature is maintained. 
The courts' power is limited to the interpretation of statutes while the 
legislature has the power to create the law.lg5 The rules guide courts 
in their interpretation of the statute so that the courts do not overstep 
their boundaries.lg6 Secondly, rules of statutory interpretation pro- 
mote uniformity and consistency in the meaning of statutes. A set of 
guidelines helps to prevent the "unbridled discretion of the judici- 
ary."lg7 If courts employ a consistent interpretive approach, the re- 
sults will be equitable and will promote the uniform administration of 
justice. 
In interpreting the causation requirement of the felony-murder 
doctrine, these principles have frequently been forgotten. Courts 
reach conclusions about which theory to use based on faulty analytical 
reasoning, often legislating and providing inconsistent results. The 
legislative history provides little guidance, and those courts that rely 
on it seem to do so only to support a more restrictive view of the fel- 
ony-murder doctrine. For example, although the court in Alvara re- 
lied on legislative history to determine that the agency theory 
192. If a statute is clear and unambiguous, the court must apply the plain meaning 
of the statute to resolve the question before i t  If the plain meaning of the statute is 
not apparent, the court must examine the larger context of the statute. The courts 
have used various contextual approaches to statutory interpretation. Some courts 
have held that unless the statutory language clearly answers the question, the pre- 
ferred interpretation is that which advances the purposes of the statute. See State v. 
Delafose, 441 k 2 d  158, 160 (Conn. 1981). Another view, based on the law and eco- 
nomics movement, is that the interpretation should reproduce the answer that would 
have been reached by the legislature that originally enacted the statute. Some courts 
look at that original intent, and then interpret the intent as it reflects present condi- 
tions and societal views. See generally Gina Limandri, Note, Realism and Reasonableness 
in Statutory Construction: People v. Anderson, 40 HAsn~cs L.J. 805 (1989). 
193. DICKERSON, supra note 89, at 8. 
194. Fxankfurter, supra note 151, at 529. 
195. Quintin Johnstone, An Evaluation of the Rules of Statutoly Intqetation, 3 KAN 
L. REV. 1 (1954). 
196. Id. at 8-9. 
197. Id. at 9. 
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applies,lg8 the court interpreted the legislative history to show that the 
new statute meant the same thing as the old statute.lg9 Because the 
principal debate during the recodification concerned the aff~rmative 
defense, the Alvara court found that there was no history to suggest 
that the scope of the doctrine should be expanded.200 Thus, to be 
consistent with the rules of statutory interpretation, courts should not 
apply the agency theory of causation unless the statute specifically 
states that the fatal shot must be fired by one of the felons.201 
Similarly, to only require "but-foryy causation is not sufficient.202 
In the felony-murder situation there is no mens rea requirement for 
the homicide. In the situation where the victim is killed by a nonpar- 
ticipant in the felony, there is also no intent for the underlying felony. 
Therefore, to only require factual causation is inherently unfair and 
does not place a sufficient burden on the prose~ution.2~~ The follow- 
ing analysis is both fair to the defendant and consistent with statutory 
interpretation. 
In the felony-murder situation, the analysis of causation requires 
a two-tiered approach. First, when defining the felonious act, the 
court must look: 
[Nlot only [at] the actual facts of the transaction, and the cir- 
cumstances surrounding it, but [also at] the matters immedi- 
ately antecedent to and having a direct causal connection 
with it, as well as acts immediately following [sic] it and so 
198. Alvarez v. District Court of Denver, 525 P.2d 1131-32 (Colo. 1974). 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 1133. Another example is found in State v. Gamer, 115 So. 2d 855 (La. 
1959). In G a m ,  the deceased was killed by a shot from a pistol fired by the bar- 
tender, who was firing at the defendant in self-defense. Id. at 857. The prosecution 
argued that the defendant had set into motion a series of events that led to the vic- 
tim's death, and that because the defendant should have known that the bartender 
would try to defend himself, the defendant should be liable for murder. Id. at 859-60. 
The Louisiana statute in effect at the time stated that a person is guilty of murder 
when the offender is engaged in the perpetration or attempted perpetration of vari- 
ous enumerated felonies. Id. at 863. The court looked toward legislative intent and 
determined that the word "offendern means actual killer. Id. at 864. Thus, the court 
applied the agency theory and concluded that to adhere to the proximate cause the- 
ory would be to amend and enlarge the statute's scope. Id. 
201. In holding that the correct theory is proximate cause, the court in State v. 
Williams, 254 So. 2d 548, 550 (Fla. Dist C t  App. 1971), stated that the test is predi- 
cated upon the ultimate purpose of the felony-murder statute, which is to prevent the 
death of innocent persons likely to occur during the commission of inherently dan- 
gerous felonies. The statute is designed to protect the innocent public. Id. at 551. 
202. See State v. Martin, 573 k 2 d  1359, 1364 (N.J. 1990). 
203. The rationale for only requiring "but-forn causation may rest on an attempt to 
justify those cases where a defendant could be liable for the death of an innocent 
bystander who is killed by a third party, but could not be liable for the death of a co- 
felon who is killed by a third party. It could be argued that "but-forn causation is 
present in the first scenario but not in the second, thus reconciling those two fact 
patterns. 
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closely connected with it as to form in reality a part of the 
Thus, the court must determine, as a first step, whether the conduct 
causing the death is conduct that is causally related to the felony. 
The statutory language that conveys this connection is "in perpe- 
tration of," "in furtherance of," "in the commission of' and "in imme- 
diate flight." Although some courts have construed the language "in 
perpetration of' to be evidence of the agency theory,205 this construc- 
tion is not accurate. The word "perpetrate" means the act of someone 
committing the crime either with his own hands or by some means or 
instrument or through some innocent agent.*06 Thus, perpetration 
goes toward the act requirement and not toward the causation 
requirement. 
Similarly, the courts construing the newer statute have found that 
the words "in furtherance of," and "in the commission of" are words 
that mean that the killing must be done by the felon or c o - f e l ~ n . ~ ~ ~  
Again, this is a misleading analysis. Those words go toward the act 
requirement and require a finding that the act of killing takes place 
within the felonious act. The purpose of those words is to exclude the 
situation where a killing occurs after the felony has been completed. 
For example, in Doane v. Cornm~nwealth~~~ a defendant ran a stop sign 
and killed a person while he was driving a car that he had stolen the 
day before. The court held that the larceny could not be used to 
make this a felony-murder because the killing occurred outside the 
res gestae of the felony.209 Compliance with the "in furtherance" lan- 
guage ensures that a defendant's conduct at the time of the killing is 
conduct that Mls within the scope of the underlying felony.*1° Thus, 
the court must first determine whether the defendant's felony dic- 
tated the conduct which led to the homicide. If so, and the time and 
204. State v. Fouquette, 221 P.2d 404, 417 (Nev. 1950), cert. denied, 341 U.S. 932 
(1951). 
205. See supra part 111 B.1. 
206. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1140 (6th ed. 1990). 
207. Other courts, however, have found that the "in furtherance" language is legis- 
lative intent of proximate cause. See State v. Young, 469 k 2 d  1189 (Conn. 1983); 
People v. Lewis, 444 N.Y.S.2d 1003 (N.Y. Sup. C t  1981); see also supra part I11 B.1. 
208. 237 S.E.2d 797 (Va. 1977). 
209. Id. at 798. 
210. In making this determination, the courts generally look at whether the homi- 
cide and the felony are closely connected in time, place, and continuity of action. See, 
e.g., State v. Hearron, 619 P.2d 1157 (Kan. 1980); State v. Adams, 98 S.W.2d 632 (Mo. 
1936); State v. Wayne, 289 S.E.2d 480 (W. Va. 1982). Cases from other jurisdictions 
diier considerably on what constitutes sufficient time, place, and continuity of action 
to find the necessary nexus. Generally, this detennination is a question for the jury. 
People v. Gladman, 359 N.E.2d 420 (N.Y. 1976). 
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place are not too remote, then the first tier of the analysis is 
satisfied.211 
Once there is evidence to support that finding, the court must 
determine if the requirement of causation has been met. Although 
the older statutes do not have any specific language that speaks to 
causation, the requirement of causation is inherent in every result- 
oriented crime.212 The newer statutes contain the language "causes 
the death of any personn213 which is the same causation language that 
is used in all homicides that require a mens rea.214 Thus, the tier of 
the causation analysis requires an approach that is similar to the ap- 
proach used by the courts in other homicide cases. 
The court must determine whether the felonious act caused the 
victim's death. In making that assessment, the court must use a two- 
prong analysis: There must be both "but-for" causation and foresee- 
ability. To satisfy "but for" causation, the court must find that the re- 
sult could not have happened in the absence of the conduct of the 
defendant. But-for causation alone, however, is not sufficient. There 
must also be legal or proximate causation.215 
211. See State v. Harrison, 564 P.2d 1321, 1323 (N.M. 1977), (finding that it is 
insufficient to conclude that there is felony-murder whenever the "'homicide is 
within the res gestae of the initial crime.' ")(quoting State v. Adams, 98 S.W.2d 632,637 
(Mo. 1936)). There must also be the requirement of causation which consists of 
those acts of the defendant "initiating and leading to the homicide without an in- 
dependent force intervening." Id. at 1324. 
212. MAVE & Scorr, supra note 44, at 277. 
213. See, e.g., AIA. CODE § 13A-6-2 (1982); ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.1 10 (1989); k z .  
REV. STAT. ANN. 13-1105(A) (1989); ARK, CODE ANN. 5-10-101 (Michie Supp. 
1991); COLO. REV. STAT. 18-3-101 (Supp. 1992); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANNANN. § 53a-54c 
(West 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit 11, § 636 (Supp. 1992); GA. CODE ANN. 16-51 (c) 
(Michie 1992); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 9, para. 9-1 (Supp. 1993); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit  
17-A, 202 (West 1983); N.J. STAT. ANN. 2C:ll-3 (West Sdpp. 1992); N.Y. PENAL 
LAW 125.25 (McKinney 1987); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 147 (1992); N.D. CENT. CODE 
g 12.1-16-01(l) (c) (1985); OR REV. STAT. § 163.115(l(b) (1991); UTAH CODE. ANN. 
§ 76-5203 (Supp. 1992); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 9A.32.030 (West Supp. 1993); WI~.  
STAT. ANN. 940.03 (West 1992). Other statutes use the word "kills." See, e.6,  IND. 
CODE ANN. § 3542-1-1 (Bums Supp. 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 707.2 (West 1979); 
NEB. REV. STAT. § 200.030 (1991); Wo. STAT. 6-2-101 (Supp. 1992). 
214. See sources cited supra note 213. 
215. Seesupra notes 128-30. There have been arguments both for an against proxi- 
mate cause. Those in Eavor of the doctrine argue that it is justified in terms of the 
underlying goals of felony-murder. It is not fair to hold a person responsible for 
deaths that are not related to the felonious conduct The goal of deterrence is also 
not met if the homicide is not a foreseeable result of the defendant's conduct. See 
Crump & Crump, supra note 12, at 384. Those against proximate cause argue that it 
inappropriately extends the felony-murder rule because the goal of deterrence can 
never be achieved by holding felons strictly responsible for killings committed by per- 
sons not acting in furtherance of the felony. People v. Washington, 402 P.2d 130,133 
(Cal. 1965). Some also argue that the tort liability concept of proximate cause can 
never be appropriate in the criminal context because of the difference between the 
rationales underlying tort and criminal law. State v. Canola, 374 A.2d 20, 30 (N.J. 
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In regular homicide cases, the problems of proximate cause arise 
when the actual result of the defendant's conduct is different from 
the result that the defendant intended.216 In a felony-murder situa- 
tion, however, a defendant may not have intended the >esult at all. In 
fact, in the situation where someone other than one of the defendants 
kills an innocent bystander, the defendant may not even be in the 
vicinity at the time of the killing.217 The question of proximate cause 
then becomes whether because of the nature of the underlying con- 
duct, the death is foreseeable. 
Courts have not had difficulty in applying the foreseeability test 
in felony-murder cases where the felon caused the victim's death. In 
these cases, the courts look at the intervening act and determine 
whether it breaks the chain of foreseeability. The intervening act can 
be the act of a third person, the victim himself, or a non-human en- 
tity. This interveningact can be a coincidence, where the defendant's 
conduct puts the victim at a certain place at a certain time. Or, the 
intervening act can be a response, where it is a reaction to conditions 
that were created by the defendant. Generally, if the intervening act 
creates a coincidence. that act will break the causal chain unless it was 
foreseeable. If the intervening act is a response to the conditions cre- 
ated by the defendant, the intervening act will only break the causal 
chain if it is an abnormal response. The same analysis should apply in 
the situation where a nonparticipant in the felony kills a police officer 
or innocent bystander. 
When a victim dies as a result of a shot that is not fired by one of 
the defendants, the death is the result of an intervening act following 
the defendants' conduct, which is the committing of the felony. The 
intervening act is the act of a third party, the nonparticipant in the 
felony.*ls When determining whether the defendant should be liable, 
1977). Although courts have held that there should be a closer and more direct 
causal connection between the felony and the killing than the causal connection re- 
quired under the tort concept of proximate cause, no valid test has been suggested. 
See id; Commonwealth v. Myers, 261 k 2 d  550,55657 (Pa. 1970); Note, Recent Caes- 
Defendant not Guilty of Felony M u r k  for Death of Co-lon Jwtzjiably Shot by Policeman- 
Commonwealth v. Redline (Pa. 1958), 71 W v .  L. REV. 1565 (1958). It would seem 
that a requirement of foreseeability as required under that proximate cause test is 
better than no test at all. Seesources cited supra notes 128-30 and accompanying text 
216. That is assuming that the homicide results from a crime of intention. Other- 
wise, the homicide must vary from the result that the conduct created a risk of 
happening. 
217. See People v. Priest, 672 P.2d 539 (Colo. Ct. App. 1983) (holding defendant 
liable under the felony-murder doctrine, even though he was sixty miles away at the 
time of the murder, because he supplied information, tools, his car, and his apart- 
ment for planning sessions, therefore knowing that the armed robbery was going to 
take place). 
218. The intervening act can also be the act of the victim himself, or something 
that is nonhuman. In the felony-murder situation, however, the intervening act is 
generally the person doing the shooting. 
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a court must first examine the intervening act of the third party to see 
if it is a coincidence or a response to the defendant's conduct. If the 
intervening act is a response to the defendant's conduct, the defend- 
ant should be liable unless the response was abnormal. If the inter- 
vening act is merely a coincidence, the defendant should be liable as 
long as the act should have been foreseeable to the defendant. 
Thus, the rules of statutory interpretation do not support the a p  
plication of the agency theory to felony-murder cases. Cases that in- 
volve a death where the bullet was not fired by one of the felons or 
where it is not clear who fired the fatal shot, should be treated in the 
same way as cases where the felon fired the fatal shot. After determin- 
ing whether the conduct that caused the death is within the felonious 
act, the court should then apply a two-prong causation analysis. If 
there is both factual and legal causation, then the defendant should 
be held liable for the death. This analysis results in a more consistent 
and uniform approach and reflects society's views toward justice. 
VI. AN APPLICATION OF THE PROPOSED ~ A L Y S I S  
When this analysis is applied a set of facts, a consistent and just 
result is reached. Assume, for example, that t'cvo co-felons rob a store 
and are pursued by police officers. During the confusion of the chase, 
a police officer mistakenly shoots and kills another police officer, be- 
lieving that he is one of the felons. Assume that the statute does not 
specifically state whether the shot must be fired by one of the felons 
for liability to attach. The first inquiry is whether the conduct that 
caused the death is within the felonious act. Here, the shooting oc- 
curred during the flight from the felony, so the conduct clearly falls 
within the scope of the underlying felony. 
There is also "but-for" causation here. But for the defendants' 
initial conduct of robbery, the police officer's death would not have 
occurred. The final inquiry is whether there is proximate cause. The 
shooting by the police officer is an intervening act that was a response 
to the defendants' initial conduct, which ~vas the robbery. It was not 
an abnormal response; in Eact those who commit forcible felonies 
know that they may encounter resistance, both to their affirmative ac- 
tions and to any escape. Thus, the death ~vas foreseeable and the de- 
fendants may be criminally liable under the felony-murder doctrine. 
However, liability may not always attach. A bank robber would 
not be liable under the felony-murder doctrine if at "the moment a 
bank robber stepped into the bank, an employee pushing the button 
for a burglar alarm was e lectro~uted."~~~ A more limited view of cau- 
sation might be employed to keep the felony-murder doctrine within 
reasonable bounds where the victim dies from excitement as a conse- 
quence of watching the gun battle or where an innocent bystander is 
219. MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.03(4) cmt. at 264 (1985). 
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killed by vigilantes who are chasing the felon. In those cases, the 
death of the victim would be "too remote, accidental in its occur- 
rence, or too dependent on another's volitional act to have a just bear- 
ing on the defendant's culpability."220 
As these examples illustrate, when a nonparticipant is killed by a 
nonparticipant during the course of a felony, the focus should be on 
the relationship between the victim's death and the felony, not on the 
individual roles of the felons. A defendant should be exculpated only 
when a death is so unexpected that it would be unjust to hold the 
defendant responsible for the result. An analysis that requires a nexus 
between the death and the felony in terms of time and place, as well as 
"but-for" causation and foreseeability, accomplishes this purpose. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although there are many different variations of the felony-mur- 
der rule, most of them do not directly address the element of causa- 
tion. Consequently, the courts have relied on different theories of 
causation to either restrict or expand liability in felony-murder cases. 
These different theories gain even greater significance when they are 
applied to the situation where someone other than the defendant kills 
a nonparticipant in the underlying felony. Under the agency theory, 
some courts have held that the prosecution must prove, as a threshold 
matter, that the shot that killed the victim came from the gun of the 
defendant or one of his confederates. Under this theory, therefore, 
there can never be liability in the situation where an innocent by- 
stander is killed by a police officer in a gun battle. 
Although some courts have required only factual causation, and 
others have required both factual causation and foreseeability, the an- 
alytical framework for these requirements has been inconsistent and 
unclear. Although the courts look toward legislative history for direc- 
tion, there is generally little guidance. The proposed analysis provides 
a framework that reflects the canons of statutory interpretation and 
allows the consistent administration of justice, even in those cases 
where it is not clear who fired the fatal shot. 
The felony-murder doctrine, though much maligned, continues 
to exist and be used as a theory of liability in forty-seven states. In fact, 
as society's fear of crime continues to escalate, the doctrine, even with 
all of its shortcomings, will continue to flourish. The courts must, 
therefore, treat the doctrine carefully and interpret its provisions cau- 
tiously and consistently. The proposed analysis of the causation re- 
quirement serves this purpose by reflecting society's view toward 
criminal liability and promoting the uniform administration ofjustice. 
220. State v. Martin, 573 k2d  1359, 1375 (N.J. 1990). 
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Author's note: Just prior to publication of this Article, the New York 
Court of Appeals released its opinion in People v. HernancZez, 624 
N.E.2d 661 (N.Y. 1993). In affirming the defendants' convictions, the 
court ended the confusion surrounding the approach that should be 
taken by the New York lower courts in determining whether the felony 
murder doctrine applies when a nonparticipant in the crime is killed 
by another nonparticipant. In its analysis, the unanimous Hernandez 
court applied the familiar tenets of statutory construction in interpret- 
ing the causation requirement for felony murder. The court held that 
"causes the death" should be construed in the same way as the identi- 
cal language in other homicide statutes. Thus, the court applied the 
broad language of proximate causation that is the law in New York. 
The Hernandez opinion represents an example of the court fol- 
lowing the analysis proposed by this author. The court's use of the 
proximate cause theory of causation instead of the agency theory fo- 
cuses on the relationship between the victim's death and the underly- 
ing felony, and not on the particular roles of the felons. The decision 
reflects the court's tradition of rigorously adhering to principles of 
statutory construction, and accomplishes the goal of the consistent ad- 
ministration of justice. 
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Statute 
In the course Causes the 
In the of and in Or in Death of Other than 
Intent perpetration furtherance immediate Enumerated any one of the Attempts Mrmative 
Required of of flight of Felonies Person partic. Covered Defense Other 
ALABAMA 
AIA. CODE 5 13A-62 (1982) 
ALASKA 
ALASKA STAT. § 11.41.110 
(1989) 
ARIZONA 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 13- 
1105 (A) (1989) 
ARKANSAS 
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-10-101 
(Michie Supp. 1991) 1 
CALIFORNIA 
CAL. PENAL CODE § 189 
(West 1988) 
COLORADO 
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-101 
(Supp. 1992) 
CONNECTICUT 
CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. 
§ 53a-54c (West 1985) 
DELAWARE 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, 
5 636 (Supp. 1992) 2 
FLORIDA 
FLA. STAT. ANN. 3 782.04 
(West 1992) 
X 
commits X 
X 
X 
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In the course Causes the 
In the of and in Or in Death of Other than 
Intent perpetration furtherance immediate Enumerated any one of the Attempts Affirmative 
Statute Required of of flight of Felonies Person partic. Covered Defense Other 
GEORGIA 
GA. CODE ANN. $ 16-5-1 
m (C) (Michie 1992) commits X 
P. 
3 
0 
HAWAII 
5 No Felony-Murder Statute 
5. IDAHO 
IDMO CODE $ 184003 
4 (Supp. 1993) 
P ILLINOIS C ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 9, para. 9- 
0 
n 
1 (Supp. 1993) 
INDIANA 
3 IND, CODE. ANN. 3 35-42-1-1 
0 
q (Burns Supp. 1992) 
N 
m 
IOWA 
P IOWA CODE ANN. $ 707.2 
P 
CO (West 1979) 
CO 
w KANSAS 
r 
CO 
CO 
KAN. STAT. ANN. 3 21-3401 (a) 
a (Supp. 1992) 
KENTUCKY 
E(Y. hv. STAT. ANN. 
$507.020 (Baldwin 1989) 3 
LOUISIANA 
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. $ 30.1 
(West Supp. 1993) 
commits 
X 
X X 
X kills 
kills 
X 
X mitigates 
X 
X 
X kills 
Heinonline - -  71 U. Det. Mercy 262 1993-1994 
262 
h 
8 
3 
E 
0 
U 
w 
z 
g 
4 
ZYNTEWITY OF DETROlT MERCY LAW REVEW [VoI. 71:223 
I. 
B 
0 
P P P 
2 c z  5; 
Y a  
qs 
fi o 2 2.2 
I.O& 2 2 %  
0 0 
4 %  fi 
g <  $Ej 3; P4 
a 
8 vl 
-2 
o E: 
E %  z I=, 
w 
8 ,  
,=.m 0 
.- a - 
I. o s  
0 E.M 
E = 
.- 
g o o  
5 5 2  
8- e, 
c o o  2 2 4  
,= 0 3  
H 
c 
0 
'3 3 e, 
5 i0 
a 
a 
" o 
,= .% 8 5 
fi 0- 
m o d 
,-I i- m ,-I ,-I 
,-I 
X 
X X X X X X X X X 
$ 
X -2 
z 
X X 
X 
Y  Y  s Y  Y  
'E' X 3 x 'E' 
E 
3 
E 
E S 8 8 8 E S
d' V1 cD 
m 
W V1 
m 
Q, 
M 
V) 
Statute 
In the course Causes the 
In the of and in Or in Death of Other than 
Intent perpetration furtherance immediate Enumerated any one of the Attempts Affirmative 
Required of of flight of Felonies Person partic. Covered Defense Other 
commits 
NEVADA 
NEV. k v .  STAT. $ 200.030 
(1991) X 
NEW HAMPSHIRE 
N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 
$? 63O:l-b (1986) 7 commits 
NEW JERSEY 
NJ. STAT. ANN. $j 2C:ll-3 
(West Supp. 1992) 
NEW MEXICO 
N.M. STAT. ANN. $30-2-1(A) 
(Michie 1984) 
NEW YORK 
N.Y. PENAL AW 5 125.25 
(McKinney 1987) 
NORTH CAROLINA 
N.C. GEN. STAT. $? 1417 
(1992) X 
NORTH DAKOTA 
N.D. CENT. CODE $ 12.1-16- 
01 (I) (C) (1985) commits X 
OHIO 
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
$ 2903.01 (Anderson 1993) 8 commits 
OKLAHOMA 
O w .  STAT. ANN. tit 21, 
$ 701.7 (West 1993) commits 
commits 
commits 
In the course Causes the 
In the of and in Or in Death of Other than 
Intent perpetration furtherance immediate Enumerated any one of the Attempts Affirmative 
Statute Required of of flight of Felonies Person partic. Covered Defense Other 
OREGON 
OR. REV. STAT. 5 163.115 
(1) (b) (1991) x x x x x x x 
PENNmLVANIA 
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, 2502 
(b) (1991) X X X 
RHODE ISLAND 
R.I. GEN. LAWS 11-23-1 
(Supp. 1992) X X 
SOUTH CAROLINA 
S.C. CODE ANN. 5 16-3-10 
(1985) X X 
SOUTH DAKOTA 
S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. 
5 22-164 (Supp. 1993) X 
TENNESSEE 
TENN. CODE ANN. !j 39-13- 
202 (1991) 9 X 
TEXAS 
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. 19- 
02(a) (3) (West 1989) 13 
UTAH 
UTAH CODE ANN. 5 76-5-203 
(Supp. 1992) 
VERMONT 
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13,s  2301 
(Supp. 1992) 
Statute 
- 
In the course Causes the 
In the of and in Or in Death of Other than 
Intent perpetration furtherance immediate Enumerated any one of the Attempts Affirmative 
Required of of flight of Felonies Person partic. Covered Defense Other 
VIRGINIA 
VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-32 
(Michie Supp. 1993) 
WASHINGTON 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 9A.32.030 (West Supp. 
1993) 
WEST VIRGINIA 
W. VA. CODE CJ 61-2-1 (1992) commits X X 
WISCONSIN 
WIS. STAT. ANN. 3 940.03 
(West 1992) commits X X X 
WYOMING 
Wo. STAT. § 6-2-101 
(Supp.1992) X X kills X 
KEY: 
1. Extreme indifference (murder), negligence (manslaughter) 8. Purposely 
2. Criminal negligence 9. Recklessly 
3. Intentional wanton extreme indifference 10. Is caused by anyone 
4. Malice 11. Penal Code defines causation 
5. Intent 12. Reasonably foreseeable consequence 
6. Unlawfully 13. An act clearly dangerous to human life 
7. Knowingly 
